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MISCONDUCT RISK 
Christina Parajon Skinner* 
 
Financial misconduct and systemic risk are two critical issues in 
financial regulation today.  However, for the past several years, financial 
misconduct and systemic risk have received markedly different treatment.  
After the global financial crisis, regulators responded to the traditional 
quantitative risks that banks pose—those found on their balance sheets and 
in their business models—with sweeping reforms on an internationally 
coordinated scale.  Meanwhile, with respect to misconduct, regulators have 
reacted with a traditional enforcement approach—imposing fines and, in 
some cases, prosecuting individual malefactors.  Yet misconduct is not only 
an isolated or idiosyncratic risk that can be spot treated with enforcement:  
misconduct can also be a significant source of risk to the financial system, 
particularly when it arises on an industry-wide basis. 
This Article creates a framework for understanding how and under what 
circumstances misconduct imposes such broad social and economic costs:  
“misconduct risk.”  This Article explores three features of the banking 
industry that, in combination, can give rise to misconduct risk—deficient 
accountability systems, performance-based compensation, and a fluid and 
transient labor market.  Drawing on this conceptual foundation, this Article 
argues that misconduct risk requires a holistic and preventive approach on 
par with regulators’ efforts to reduce classic balance sheet risks.  
Specifically, this Article urges bank supervisors to design regulatory tools 
that proactively target these contagion mechanisms in order to combat 
misconduct risk.  This Article proposes a novel supervisory tool—
“compliance stress testing”—and suggests how this tool can be 
incorporated into the existing international framework for regulating 
global banks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (“the Crisis”) motivated a sweeping 
overhaul of financial regulation on an internationally coordinated scale.  In 
this post-Crisis order, regulators have singled out large global banks as 
posing systemic risk—that is, the risk that distress in one global bank will 
spread broadly among other financial institutions, with further spillover 
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effects quite likely.1  This concern with systemic risk has led to tighter 
restrictions on (and supervision over) banks’ financial activity.2 
Financial misconduct has received markedly different treatment.  
Although the world’s major economies now agree that bank misconduct is a 
serious problem, they have yet to diagnose it as a market-wide risk that 
requires forward-looking, preventative, and well-coordinated solutions.3  
Indeed, each jurisdiction still responds to misconduct with primarily an ex 
post enforcement approach.4  But misconduct is not only an isolated or 
idiosyncratic risk that can be spot treated with enforcement.  When bankers 
and traders in large financial institutions manipulate or distort key 
information,5 that misconduct can pose broad macro risks.  In some 
instances, such misconduct contributes to asset bubbles by fueling irrational 
demand; in others, it weakens large institutions by frustrating market 
 
 1. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank:  Contingent Capital and 
the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (2011); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008). 
 2. Hearing on Compensation Structure & Systemic Risk Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (written testimony of Prof. Lucian Bebchuk), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/Policy/FSC-written-testimony-June-11-09.pdf 
[perma.cc/47ZG-ZC5Q]. 
 3. See Mark J. Flannery, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis, 
Insights into the SEC’s Risk Assessment Programs (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/insights-into-sec-risk-assessment-programs.html 
(contrasting the SEC’s mission to detect misconduct with its assessment of “market-wide” or 
“systemic” risks) [perma.cc/9YKR-5VNJ]; see also HM TREASURY, BANK OF ENG., FIN. 
CONDUCT AUTH., FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW:  FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter 
FAIR AND EFFECTIVE MARKETS REVIEW], http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf (addressing misconduct as a problem, but not specifically 
through a systemic risk lens) [perma.cc/6BJG-AYHK]. But see EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., 
REPORT ON MISCONDUCT RISK IN THE BANKING SECTOR 3 (2015) [hereinafter ESRB REPORT 
ON MISCONDUCT], https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150625_report_misconduct_ 
risk.en.pdf (suggesting that misconduct may present systemic risks) [perma.cc/6PK8-
KCQW]. 
 4. See GRP. OF THIRTY, BANKING CONDUCT AND CULTURE:  A CALL FOR SUSTAINED AND 
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 43 (2015) [hereinafter G30 CONDUCT AND CULTURE REPORT] 
(noting that across jurisdictions “[t]here has been significant emphasis on prescriptive 
conduct rules” and “[t]his has led to an enforcement-led approach to supervised firms”); id. 
at 55 (noting the “current default approach . . . of almost sole reliance on deterrence and 
enforcement”); see also Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 585–
611 (2012) (arguing that as a policy matter it is easier to punish than to regulate); David 
Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1450 (2014) (reviewing 
enforcement actions in the United States reacting to the Crisis). 
 5. Before proceeding further, some definitional clarification is needed.  In its broadest 
sense, financial misconduct is difficult to define.  As scholars have elsewhere noted, 
opportunistic or even deceptive conduct in commercial contexts is often not necessarily 
specified as illegal. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971, 1978–80 (2006).  Moreover, the law is often unsuccessful in setting clear boundaries 
along the continuum of unethical to illegal behavior.  This Article is not focused on all 
possible instances of misconduct; nor is its goal to write a code of conduct that defines 
specific acts that are or should be considered illegal or unethical.  Rather, this Article’s goal 
is to draw regulators’ attention to the way in which information-distorting conduct has the 
potential to disrupt economic stability and therefore presents a “macroprudential” concern. 
See BEVERLEY HIRTLE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 409, 
MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:  LESSONS FROM THE SCAP 1 
(2009). 
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discipline and regulatory supervision.  At a minimum, misconduct can give 
rise to a range of social and economic costs by, for example, depressing 
market confidence or disrupting liquidity.  On that view, much like the 
balance sheet risks that receive so much attention, financial misconduct is 
also a safety and soundness issue that bank regulators worldwide should 
seek to address. 
This is a critical time to reevaluate the optimal design of banking 
regulation.  Five years have passed since national bank regulators convened 
in the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and agreed to the third 
Basel Accord (“Basel III”), a regime designed to reduce the systemic risks 
that banks pose.6  Pursuant to Basel III’s heightened standards, national 
bank regulators have steadily implemented its new capital and liquidity 
requirements—rules that increase banks’ equity cushion against (potential) 
financial shocks.  These operate as a prophylactic of sorts to guard against 
the possibility of another financial-domino type crisis.7  Yet Basel III offers 
no comparably concrete standards for regulating banking conduct, leaving 
global markets exposed to a significant source of material risk and a lack of 
internationally coordinated standards to address it.  Now, in 2016, 
regulators are becoming increasingly concerned about filling this gap.8 
This Article’s goal is to motivate and inform a redesign of the existing 
regulatory regime to squarely address misconduct as an ongoing market-
wide risk.  To that end, Parts I and II build a framework for understanding 
misconduct as a distinct category of risk to the financial system:  
“misconduct risk.”9  This framework has two components.  First, the 
framework defines misconduct risk:  the intentional distortion of 
information that, when aggregated and synchronized across institutions, 
undermines market safety and soundness.  Part I illustrates this definition 
with two case studies.  The first case is the Crisis, which was triggered by 
an asset bubble.  By illustrating the role of misconduct in the subprime 
mortgage bubble, Part I sheds light on the way in which misconduct can 
contribute to a systemic banking crisis.  The second case is the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal, in which banks colluded to 
 
 6. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III:  A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 54–57 (2010; revised 
2011) [hereinafter BASEL III], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [perma.cc/NP78-338P].  
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized regulators to enact stricter standards on large global banks. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:  Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1059 
(2012). 
 7. These rules require banks to maintain a certain amount of capital (equity) at all times 
(as a percentage of their outstanding liabilities). See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 198 (2009). 
 8. See, e.g., ESRB REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 3; FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
MARKETS REVIEW, supra note 3; G30 CONDUCT AND CULTURE REPORT, supra note 4. 
 9. Although the concept of misconduct risk is original to the author, the Financial 
Stability Board and the European Systemic Risk Board also began using the term in a similar 
fashion while this Article was in draft. See ESRB REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 3; 
FIN. STABILITY BD., MEASURES TO REDUCE MISCONDUCT RISK:  PROGRESS REPORT (2015), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Misconduct-risk-progress-report.pdf 
[perma.cc/7LPZ-WS97]. 
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manipulate an international interest rate benchmark.  The LIBOR case 
shows that, even short of full-blown crises, misconduct can have system-
wide consequences.  LIBOR also serves as an important reminder that 
misconduct has not been sufficiently addressed since the Crisis and 
therefore still could theoretically manifest in another systemic crisis if 
perpetrated in a different set of market and economic circumstances.  Both 
cases, though examples of different kinds of market distortions, assumed a 
systemic quality largely because the misconduct spread among large 
financial institutions. 
Accordingly, the second part of the framework provides a theory for why 
misconduct spreads so readily in the global banking sector.  Part II focuses 
on three structural features of banks that have the potential to operate in 
tandem as a misconduct contagion.  The first is a deficiency in internal 
accountability systems at the managing director level and where complexity 
is concerned.  Here, because professional consequences can be 
disconnected from bad behavior, junior and mid-level bankers who are 
peripherally engaged in (or prone toward) profit-motivated misconduct are 
able to move freely among institutions.  The second feature builds on the 
first and relates to the performance-based compensation structure that has 
become the industry standard.  This compensation system can skew 
incentives, making the upside of misconduct loom larger than the estimated 
downside.  Overall, weak accountability combined with performance-based 
compensation can make misconduct seem like a rational choice on an 
industry-wide basis. 
The third feature relates to the fluid and transient nature of the banking 
labor market, in which bankers and traders move freely and frequently 
among institutions, building networks in the process.  Ultimately, the highly 
networked nature of the banking sector creates an environment conducive to 
disseminating business norms through influence, which can, in certain 
situations, spread a social license for misconduct by making deviance 
normal.  In identifying these mechanisms, this Article moves beyond the 
current regulatory debate that generally acknowledges misconduct as a 
problem and theorizes the structural and institutional drivers of systemically 
significant misconduct. 
The framework set out in Parts I and II provides a foundation to critique 
the current architecture of global banking regulation as insufficiently 
addressed to misconduct risk.  Part III begins with this critique:  that Basel 
relies too heavily on quantitative risk management to deal with balance 
sheet risks and pays scant attention to misconduct risk.  It then offers a 
solution for rebalancing this regime.  Designing a regulatory tool that is 
likely to be effective in reducing misconduct risk requires a careful 
assessment of regulators’ abilities and weaknesses when it comes to 
preventing misconduct.  As compared to the banks themselves, regulators 
have less expertise, information, and resources required to understand how 
and where banks are vulnerable to misconduct.  By contrast, regulators, 
through their supervisory tools, have the ability to activate the private 
market and harness its resources. 
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Based on that comparative assessment, Part III proposes a novel 
regulatory tool—what I call “compliance stress testing”—for incorporating 
misconduct-related goals into the existing regime of global bank regulation.  
Compliance stress testing draws on both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of existing stress tests.  The process involves regulators gathering 
information from banks about their existing compliance programs and 
requiring banks to respond to scenario-based exercises designed to identify 
their vulnerabilities to misconduct risk.  In a broad sense, the argument for 
compliance stress testing responds to other scholars who seek a more robust 
discussion of compliance in legal academic literature.10  In a narrower 
sense, however, the specific proposal to enhance regulatory supervision 
over banks’ compliance parts ways from other scholars who have viewed 
the intervention of government regulators in corporate compliance with 
skepticism.11 
This Article concludes with a blueprint for achieving international 
coordination around this new supervisory tool.  Focusing on the Basel 
Committee as a key fulcrum for national regulatory action, Part III urges 
Basel to incorporate compliance stress testing into the Basel III regime.12  
To overcome the political economy obstacles to coordination over new 
regulatory goals, this Article proposes that the Basel Committee use risk-
weighted capital ratios—specifically, the discretion to reduce them—as 
carrots to spur states to adopt compliance stress testing. 
Using capital to motivate states’ regulatory action has two main benefits.  
The principal benefit is that it strengthens Basel’s standards for reducing 
misconduct risk and coordinates adoption of those standards.  An ancillary 
benefit is the possibility to lessen the externalities that the current level of 
capital restrictions has caused.13  Broadly speaking, this prescription for 
using Basel’s capital rules to coordinate international regulatory behavior 
suggests that this informal institution of international financial regulation is 
more powerful than others have thought14:  it has the potential to structure 
incentives among sovereign states, which can lead to desirable regulatory 
 
 10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE (2014). 
 11. See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
949 (2009); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance (unpublished 
manuscript) (May 31, 2015) (on file with author). But see Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing 
Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act:  Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 92–100 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank did not go far enough in 
regulating compliance). 
 12. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004) (conceptualizing “new sovereignty” as “the capacity to 
participate in the international and transgovernmental regimes, networks, and institutions 
that are now necessary to allow governments to accomplish through cooperation with one 
another what they could once only hope to accomplish acting alone within a defined 
territory”); see also HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:  
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION (20th ed. 2014). 
 13. See infra Part III.B (discussing the possible decline in liquidity and growth of 
shadow banking system that has followed increased capital requirements). 
 14. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:  RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2d ed. 2015). 
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convergence.  In making this proposal, this Article joins other scholars who 
have argued that Basel’s current one-size-capital-fits-all approach is neither 
the most economically efficient nor the most prudentially sound.15 
Ultimately, conceptualizing misconduct risk as a distinct category of risk 
to the financial system should prompt bank regulators, like central banks, to 
more readily embrace the need for new tools to supervise banking conduct.  
Moreover, the specific tool that this Article proposes shows that regulators 
can effectively and efficiently incorporate misconduct risk into existing 
regulatory frameworks.16 
I.  THE CONCEPT OF MISCONDUCT RISK 
After the Crisis, financial regulation in the world’s most significant 
financial economies pivoted toward a “macroprudential approach.”17  
Whereas prior to the Crisis, regulation was concerned principally with firm-
level stability, the post-Crisis framework has become much more mindful 
of how regulation should be designed to address threats to the “financial 
system as a whole.”18  Among other things, this macroprudential 
philosophy stimulated intense attention to the myriad sources of systemic 
risk.  Not surprisingly, as the focus on systemic risk has grown, so too has 
the debate over the definition of that term. 
Classically, systemic risk was viewed as the possibility that institutional 
distress—traditionally, a bank failure—could have a domino-type effect, 
leading to other firm failures and an overall contraction of the financial 
system.19  More recently, scholars have entertained a slightly looser 
 
 15. See Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial 
Institutions:  Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(2014).  Notably, however, Romano urges greater regulatory diversity within the Basel 
regime, “challeng[ing] the present-day enthusiasm for international regulatory harmonization 
and the notion that harmonization is a panacea for systemic risk.” Id. at 5. 
 16. Framing misconduct as a market failure that is caused by market participants’ 
strategic behavior also extends the classic debate on government intervention in markets and 
relative transaction costs to the context of financial misconduct. See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) (discussing the theory of market failure); R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (suggesting that transaction costs are lower 
when private institutions, rather than government regulators, allocate resources). 
 17. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf (explaining this 
approach as one that “supplements traditional supervision and regulation of individual firms 
or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the stability of the financial system as a 
whole”) [perma.cc/M7CB-MQ53]. 
 18. Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2011); see Anil K. Kashyap et al., The Macroprudential Toolkit, 
59 IMF ECON. REV. 145 (2011). 
 19. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes:  A Study in Complex Financial 
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 664–65 (2012); Serafín 
Martínez-Jaramillo et al., Systemic Risk, Financial Contagion and Financial Fragility, 34 J. 
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 2358, 2359 (2010) (conceptually modeling systemic risk as 
involving “first, an initial random shock which affects . . . one or more financial institutions 
and second, a contagion mechanism which transmits such negative effects to other 
institutions on the system”); Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 204 (defining systemic risk as an 
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definition of the term by including indirect threats to the proper functioning 
of markets, which may not themselves cause bank failures or systemic 
crises, but do increase the possibility of those outcomes.20  Under either 
view, misconduct has been largely excluded.21 
The goal of Part I is to draw attention to the ways in which misconduct 
can give rise to the type of negative externalities that motivate post-Crisis 
regulatory interventions on macroprudential (or systemic risk) grounds.22  
Through the Crisis example, Part I.A sheds light on at least one link 
between misconduct and classic systemic risk—namely, that misconduct 
can contribute to asset bubbles, which may, in turn, lead to a systemic 
banking crisis.  In Part I.B, a second example, involving the manipulation 
of LIBOR and the foreign exchange markets (“forex”), shows that 
misconduct continues to manifest in various and unanticipated ways since 
the Crisis, outmaneuvering the existing regulatory apparatus.  Although 
these later cases did not in the end result in systemic consequences, they 
illustrate that the risk of such a seismic outcome continues to exist.  Overall, 
the examples in Part I help sharpen the distinction between misconduct risk 
(a macro concern) and misconduct that is idiosyncratic, rogue, or 
epiphenomenal. 
 
economic shock that triggers a chain of institutional or market failures that results in an 
increased cost of capital or decreased availability of capital). 
 20. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 19, at 659–60, 665 (defining complexity as systemic risk 
and also noting that “the notion of what constitutes a ‘systemic risk’ has broadened”); Robert 
C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. (forthcoming 
2016) (manuscript at 24) (on file with author), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580078 (defining 
key markets and prices as systemic risk) [perma.cc/EYL2-7U58]; Geoffrey P. Miller & 
Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard:  How Conceptual Bias in Complex Organizations 
Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 808 (2011) (defining 
intellectual hazard as systemic risk). 
 21. For the body of legal and finance scholarship on systemic risk since the Crisis, see, 
for example, Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:  Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1370–1412 (2011) (studying the 
challenges of regulating systemic risks); John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms 
and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 35 (2014) (referring to systemic risks 
posed by management practices); Coffee, Jr., supra note 6, at 1050 (suggesting that systemic 
risk was a product of a “too big to fail” subsidy for large financial institutions); Julie A.D. 
Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 181, 
205–11 (2013) (arguing that “the blending of commercial banking and investment banking 
produce[s] . . . systemic risk”); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 808 (arguing that “the 
tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex 
organizations” is a source of systemic risk); Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall 
Street:  Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 343–46 (2013) 
(suggesting that banks’ nontraditional activities pose systemic risks); Schwarcz, supra note 
1, at 198–204 (offering the first scholarly definition of systemic risk); Daniel Schwarcz & 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014) 
(studying previously unrecognized systemic risk in the insurance industry). 
 22. To be sure, not all bank misconduct generates macroprudential or systemic risk 
concerns.  “If a bank loses money from a risky investment, that is not systemic.  But 
institutional failure, market seizure, infrastructure breakdown[,] or even a sharp rise in the 
cost of financial services can have serious adverse implications for many other market 
participants.  In these cases, there is a systemic dimension.” Jaime Caruana, Systemic Risk:  
How to Deal With It?, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Feb. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
othp08.htm#P1 [perma.cc/RZ4Z-WRWM]. 
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A.  The 2008 Financial Crisis 
Asset bubbles are one of the most common historical causes of systemic 
crises, and misconduct has played a key role in some of these.23  The South 
Sea Bubble of 1720 may be the earliest example of a severe market crash 
precipitated by an asset bubble that was fueled by fraud and deception.  In 
the early eighteenth century, the English House of Lords gave the South Sea 
Company a monopoly over South American trade, positioning it to rival the 
East India Trading Company.24  The company’s business was, however, 
“blighted from the outset”—saddled with insufficient experience, delivery 
failure, and, eventually, war with Spain.25  In order to perpetuate the 
illusion of profit, the company’s directors circulated “fanciful tales of South 
Sea riches.”26  These false but “extravagant rumors”27 stoked demand for 
the stock and incited a period of investor mania, driving the share’s value to 
nearly ten times what it was probably worth.28  When the bubble finally 
burst, individuals and institutions were ruined, and the Bank of England 
was forced to bail out the company to spare the national economy from 
debilitating harm.29 
Fast-forwarding 275 years, the Crisis was similarly fueled by an asset 
bubble.30  The conventional narrative of the Crisis is by now relatively 
well-settled.  As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission succinctly 
recounted, 
[I]t was the collapse of the housing bubble—fueled by low interest rates, 
easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages—that was 
the spark that ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in 
the fall of 2008.31 
 
 23. See Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles:  An Experimental-Asset-Market 
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 982 (noting that 
“[e]conomists generally define asset-price bubbles as the divergence of the price of an asset 
or asset class from its fundamental value”). See generally Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin 
Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 18398, 2012). 
 24. Ellen Castelow, South Sea Bubble, HISTORIC UK, http://www.historic-uk.com/ 
HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/South-Sea-Bubble/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/ 
6PEN-JDDX]; James Narron & David Skeie, Crisis Chronicles:  The South Sea Bubble of 
1720—Repackaging Debt and the Current Reach for Yield, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (Nov. 
8, 2013), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/11/crisis-chronicles-the-south-
sea-bubble-of-1720repackaging-debt-and-the-current-reach-for-yield.html#.VX3TeflVhBc 
[perma.cc/4WBF-D5VE]. 
 25. See RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH:  LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 49–
50 (2004). 
 26. South Sea Bubble Short History, HARV. BUS. SCH., http://www.library.hbs.edu/ 
hc/ssb/history.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/72JR-W227]. 
 27. DAVID E. Y. SARNA, HISTORY OF GREED:  FINANCIAL FRAUD FROM TULIP MANIA TO 
BERNIE MADOFF 25 (2010); see Castelow, supra note 24. 
 28. SARNA, supra note 27, at 25–26; South Sea Bubble Short History, supra note 26. 
 29. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 76 (1984). 
 30. See Eric S. Rosengren, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Asset Bubbles and 
Systemic Risk (Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2010/ 
030310 [perma.cc/7KKP-43YR]. 
 31. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:  FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
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The Crisis involved a secondary bubble as well, surrounding the 
securities that large, global banks created from these toxic loans—
mortgaged-backed securities32 (MBS).  Over the past several years, 
scholars, policymakers, and commentators have offered various 
explanations for the Crisis, which range from moral hazard to housing 
policy.33  Among them is misconduct, insofar as misconduct played some 
contributing role in both bubbles by loosening the credit supply and by 
fueling supply and demand for (unsustainable) securitized mortgage 
products.34 
In particular, a body of research has emerged discussing the Crisis as a 
“supply-side phenomenon,” that is, the byproduct of a significant loosening 
of credit.35  As Alejandro Justiniano and his coauthors explained, “The 
housing boom that preceded the Great Recession was the result of an 
increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the 
mortgage market.”36  Some scholars, courts, and commentators have since 
concluded that misconduct contributed to this loosening.37  Blackburn and 
 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/ 
GPO-FCIC.pdf [perma.cc/Y8FX-2DT5]. 
 32. See Judge, supra note 19, at 693 (noting that the Crisis was “two related but distinct 
bubbles—one in real estate and a second in mortgage securities”). 
 33. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 1, at 800 (arguing that a “too big to fail” subsidy 
developed, which stoked moral hazard in big banks); see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger 
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 265–66 (2010) (showing empirically 
that executive compensation gave rise to asymmetrical incentives and fueled excessive risk 
taking); John B. Taylor, Getting Back on Track:  Macroeconomic Policy Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis, 92 FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 165, 166–67 (2010) (arguing that 
departures in monetary policy from the so-called Taylor Rule led to build up of debt and 
excessive risk taking); Norbert J. Michel, Government Policies Caused the Financial Crisis 
and Made the Recession Worse, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/commentary/2015/1/government-policies-caused-the-financial-crisis-and-made-the-
recession-worse (discussing the role of housing policy and government-sponsored 
enterprises in contributing to the bubble) [perma.cc/G5F7-35Q3]; Peter J. Wallison, Fannie, 
Freddie Caused the Financial Crisis, AM. ENT. INST. (Nov. 25, 2011), https://www.aei.org/ 
publication/fannie-freddie-caused-the-financial-crisis (discussing the role of housing policy 
in contributing to the bubble) [perma.cc/BU7H-JGZP]. 
 34. See William C. Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Asset Bubbles 
and the Implications for Central Bank Policy (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.bis.org/ 
review/r100409c.pdf (noting that there were two innovations related to the housing boom:  
“innovations . . . in housing finance, where subprime lending made mortgage credit available 
to households that were much less creditworthy, and . . . in structured finance instruments 
such as [CDOs]”) [perma.cc/QR8Q-8RWS]. 
 35. Adam J. Levitan & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. 
L.J. 1177, 1181 (2012); see ALEJANDRO JUSTINIANO ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
STAFF REPORT NO. 709, CREDIT SUPPLY AND THE HOUSING BOOM (2015). 
 36. JUSTINIANO ET AL., supra note 35, abstract. 
 37. See, e.g., McKinley L. Blackburn & Todd Vermilyea, The Prevalence and Impact of 
Misstated Incomes on Mortgage Loan Applications, 21 J. HOUSING ECON. 151, 151 (2012) 
(“One of the explanations that is commonly offered for the increased rates of lending in the 
mid-2000s is a lack of diligence in documenting income on mortgage loan applications by 
lending institutions.”); Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on 
Mortgage Applications During the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005, at 14 (Kreisman 
Working Paper Series in Housing L. & Pol’y, No. 21, 2015) (providing examples where “the 
mortgage originator and buyer work together to commit fraud” and noting that “during the 
mortgage credit expansion from 2002 to 2005, we know originators failed to monitor and 
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Vermilyea, for example, provide one of the first academic studies “that 
reflect[s] the degree to which incomes in mid-2000 home-purchase 
mortgage loan applications were overstated relative to the true incomes of 
mortgage applicants.”38 
Likewise, a 2015 paper from Princeton economist Atif Mian and Chicago 
Booth School’s Amir Sufi studied income falsification and its connection to 
the subprime housing bubble.39  Consistent with the supply-side theory, 
they concluded that “the expansion of credit in subprime zip codes was 
more likely due to a fundamental credit supply shock than exogenous 
increases in house price expectations in these neighborhoods,” which 
created “vicious cycle[s] where a housing bubble pulled in even more 
credit.”40  In part, they credit the correlation between this “boom-bust 
cycle” and the subprime market to “fraudulent reporting of income[s],” 
which “becomes more necessary when house prices are higher because of 
the need to meet debt-to-income restrictions.”41 
Although smaller banks and originators were involved in these practices, 
so too were larger institutions.  One internal memorandum to loan officers 
at J.P. Morgan instructed:  “If you do not get [approval], try resubmitting 
with slightly higher income.  Inch it up $500 to see if you can get the 
findings you want.  Do the same for assets.”42  For similar such conduct, the 
 
screen potential borrowers” and that in some cases they “falsified income information by 
borrowers without the borrowers’ knowledge”); see also Complaint ¶ 1, SEC v. J.P. Morgan 
Securities LLC, No. 1:12-cv-01872 (RLW) (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012) (alleging that Bear, 
Stearns & Co. did not disclose its practice “in connection with [residential] MBS offerings[] 
of negotiating cash settlements with mortgage loan originators that violated the 
representations, warranties, and covenants made to Bear by the originators after the loans 
were securitized [and not] notifying the trusts that owned the loans”); Complaint ¶ 2, United 
States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-cv-1422 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2012) (alleging 
that Countrywide sold bad loans to Fannie and Freddie by “eliminat[ing] every significant 
checkpoint on loan quality and compensated its employees solely based on the volume of 
loans originated, leading to rampant instances of fraud and other serious loan defects, all 
while Countrywide was informing the GSEs [Fannie and Freddie] that it, too, had tightened 
its underwriting guidelines”); Complaint ¶ 1, FDIC v. Killinger, No. 2:11-cv-459 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 16, 2011) (alleging that executives were “focused on short term gains to increase 
their own compensation, with reckless disregard for WaMu’s longer term safety and 
soundness”); Complaint ¶¶ 2–8, SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV09-03994 VBF AJWX (C.D. Cal. 
June 4, 2009) (alleging that three Countrywide executives failed to disclose the risks 
associated with their underwriting practices and the fact that its business model, which 
depended on selling its loans into the secondary mortgage market, was unsustainable); Chris 
Dolmetsch & Dakin Campbell, U.S. Files Civil Mortgage Fraud Suit Against Wells Fargo, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-09/u-
s-files-civil-mortgage-fraud-suit-against-wells-fargo [perma.cc/E6PD-63ND]; Shayndi 
Raice, Jury Decides Against BofA on ‘Hustle’ Program, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303615304579153900661389242 
[perma.cc/4TW7-FDYA]; Landon Thomas Jr., Jury Finds Bank of America Liable in 
Mortgage Case, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (Oct. 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/23/jury-finds-bank-of-america-liable-in-mortgage-case-nicknamed-the-hustle/?_r=0 
(reporting on the Bank of America “HSSL” program) [perma.cc/C4F5-TJVN]. 
 38. Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note 37, at 152. 
 39. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. at 31. 
 41. Id. at 32. 
 42. Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note 37, at 151. 
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Federal Reserve Bank (“the Fed”) assessed an $85 million civil penalty 
against Wells Fargo; its employees had allegedly “falsified income 
information in mortgage applications.”43  As the New York Times reported, 
“Some of the nation’s largest lenders, including Countrywide, Wells 
Fargo[,] and Ameriquest,44 overstated the income of borrowers—without 
telling them—to qualify them for larger loans than they could afford.”45  
The result was a sizable (oversized) body of so-called “toxic” subprime 
loans, which large financial institutions desired as the “raw material[s]” for 
their “mortgage machine”46—the creation of MBS and financial products 
structured from these MBS,47 like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
Here, too, in the market for securitized mortgage products, misconduct 
may have played a role in exacerbating the Crisis.  In some cases, bankers 
failed to adequately perform due diligence with respect to the loans they 
were including in their securitized and structured products or with respect to 
the mortgage originators and their practices.  At least two international 
banks, Nomura and the Royal Bank of Scotland, were found by Judge 
Denise Cote to have enticed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy mortgage 
securities by misrepresenting (or not fully disclosing) the risks associated 
with the underlying collateral.48  Under federal securities law, Regulation 
AB requires disclosure of the originators’ practices and a description of the 
underwriting criteria.49  Yet, in that case, Nomura “failed to subject 
thousands of the loans at issue . . . to genuine credit or valuation diligence, 
opting instead to use less expensive screening mechanisms.  And once the 
 
 43. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110720a.htm 
[perma.cc/3NDT-2KEJ]; see Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil 
Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent, In re Wells Fargo & Co., Nos. 11-094-B-HC1, 11-
094-I-HC1, 11-094-B-HC2, 11-094-I-HC2 (July 20, 2011). 
 44. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted, fraud at institutions like 
Ameriquest (a California-based subprime lender) was “emulated” throughout the industry. 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 31, at 12.  These practices included inflating home 
appraisals, misleading investors about the nature of their interest rates, or switching the 
interest rates altogether. Id. 
 45. Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse, 
N.Y. TIMES:  UPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-
mortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/2E3V-EEYF].  This is 
not to suggest that borrowers had no fault; in many cases, they were complicit. 
 46. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 31, at 102–03. 
 47. Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has stated that 
“mortgage products such as [residential] MBS were ground zero in the financial crisis” and 
that “[m]isrepresentations in connection with the creation and sale of mortgage securities 
contributed greatly to the tremendous losses suffered by investors once the U.S. housing 
market collapsed.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan & Credit Suisse with 
Misleading Investors in RMBS Offerings (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/ 
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171486012#.VSP_qfnF940 [perma.cc/RH8L-RG9U]. 
 48. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 441, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015) (“[T]he origination and securitization of these defective loans not 
only contributed to the collapse of the housing market, the very macroeconomic factor that 
defendants say caused the losses, but once that collapse started, improperly underwritten 
loans were hit hardest and drove the collapse even further.”). 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 229.110 (2014). 
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loans were on Nomura’s books . . . [it] performed no further diligence.”50  
The court also referred to the Royal Bank of Scotland’s diligence as 
“perfunctory.”51 
In many cases, however, the banks’ (or, more precisely, certain bankers’) 
conduct may not have been illegal.  Even so, the bankers’ behavior may 
have been an unethical breach of their professional duty to ensure the 
integrity of the information that their clients and counterparties were relying 
on to make financial decisions.  There are several known examples of this 
kind of misconduct.  One journalist, Felix Salmon, documented the practice 
of third-party diligence, which a company called Clayton Holdings 
frequently performed.52  After a bank obtained a pool of mortgages, 
Clayton would re-diligence a representative sample.53  In one case, for 
example, even though Clayton rejected 45 percent of the loans in the 
sample, the bank did not perform further diligence on the remaining loans 
or pass this information on to investors.54  Based on his research, Salmon 
concluded, “[I]t [is] clear that the banks had price-sensitive information on 
the quality of the loan pool which they failed to pass on to investors in that 
pool.”55 
In one case (and there appears to be more),56 traders at Citigroup were 
alleged to have committed securities fraud in connection with the 
structuring and marketing of a CDO “squared”—a synthetic CDO that 
contains a credit default swap (CDS) that references other CDOs.57  The 
product was structured and marketed in 2007, when the housing market had 
already begun to decline.58  Aware of the direction the market was headed, 
Citigroup allegedly decided to take a short position in the CDO by buying 
protection against it.59  Despite the fact that it was betting against the very 
assets it had selected, Citigroup allegedly failed to disclose that fact to 
investors.60  Ultimately, the investors in the CDOs lost all of their principal 
investment.61  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
brought a civil securities fraud suit against Citigroup, which it settled for 
 
 50. Nomura, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 470. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Felix Salmon, The Enormous Mortgage-Bond Scandal, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/10/13/the-enormous-mortgage-bond-scandal 
[perma.cc/36VA-MCPQ]. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  ANATOMY OF A 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 330 (2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Financial_ 
Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2 [perma.cc/SR9E-B5Q3]. 
 57. Complaint, SEC v. Stoker ¶ 1, No. 11-cv-7388 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. ¶¶ 17–18, 23–34. 
 60. See id. ¶ 60. 
 61. See id. ¶ 77. 
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$285 million (and without admitting misconduct).62  Again, even assuming 
the Citigroup traders’ behavior was consistent with the letter of the 
securities law, the distortion of information involved was probably 
unethical and certainly had economically distorting effects. 
This sketch of the Crisis and the various kinds (and degrees) of 
misconduct involved is in no way intended as a comprehensive accounting 
of the misbehavior that took place in the run-up to the Crisis.  Rather, this 
brief sampling is offered to illustrate the systemic quality of misconduct 
involved:  by spreading broadly across institutions, fraud and other forms of 
information distortion can exacerbate bubbles and contribute to dangerous 
risk correlation by amplifying and synchronizing demand for an 
unsustainable asset.63 
B.  LIBOR 
As William Dudley of the New York Fed has noted, “The pattern of bad 
behavior did not end with the Crisis, but continued despite the considerable 
public sector intervention that was necessary to stabilize the financial 
system.”64  The following case study of the manipulation of the LIBOR 
benchmark and forex illustrates that even short of contributing to crises, 
misconduct can nonetheless assume systemic significance by imposing 
other social and economic costs on market participants and the real 
economy.  The case also underscores that misconduct risk is an evolving 
and shape-shifting problem.  As misconduct continues to manifest in 
various (even unexpected) ways, the existing regulatory framework must 
also adapt, both to reduce the costs on third parties that misconduct imposes 
and to minimize the possibility that misconduct will contribute to another 
systemic event. 
LIBOR is an interest rate benchmark that is one of the most important 
indices in the world.  Trillions of dollars of assets and loans are pegged to 
this rate and it serves as the basis for public and private contracts 
worldwide.65  For these reasons, Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova have 
referred to LIBOR as a “systemically significant price” that demands 
enhanced prudential regulation on par with that imposed on systemically 
 
 62. See Chad Bray, Judge Unloads on Deal SEC Struck with Citi, WALL STREET J., 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020422460457702856 
4166670848 [perma.cc/A8FB-PZ6N]. 
 63. Risk correlation—where large financial institutions pursue the same asset strategy—
implies that the failure of one will result in the distress of the others, like a chain of 
“financial dominos.” Coffee, Jr., supra note 6, at 1057; see also Richard Squire, Shareholder 
Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1156–63 (2010) (arguing 
that firms engage in “correlation-seeking” by incurring contingent debt that correlates with 
its insolvency risk). 
 64. William C. Dudley, Pres. & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the 
Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 
2014), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [perma.cc/ 
Z85U-5DEP]. 
 65. The Rotten Heart of Finance, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), http://www. 
economist.com/node/21558281 [perma.cc/4U34-GJR3]. 
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important institutions.66  To compile the rate, the British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) would ask a panel of six or more large international 
banks each day:  “[A]t what rate could you borrow funds [in the interbank 
market] just prior to 11 [a.m.]?”67  The methodology was simple and clean, 
albeit based in a loose honor system, as banks were not required to 
substantiate their answers.  In 2012, the public discovered that several of 
the large contributing banks had manipulated the benchmark—beginning as 
early as 2005.68 
Traders manipulated these rates for two different reasons.  The first was 
for profit—small changes in the LIBOR rate could yield substantial swings 
in profit, given the notional value of many contracts that used the LIBOR 
rate.69  The other reason was to inflate institutional health during the 
troubled Crisis years.  There was a (not unfounded) fear that if a bank was 
perceived as weak—unable to raise funds in the interbank market—it might 
fall prey to runs, the likes of which had claimed Bear Stearns.70  It was for 
that reason that one Barclays manager told a submitter not to “stick its head 
above the parapet.”71 
To those ends, traders colluded with others inside and outside of their 
firms to manipulate the daily submissions.  Many exchanges were captured 
in emails and instant messaging and provide a startling window into the 
norms and camaraderie that arose from manipulating these rates.  Messages 
show how traders not only condoned, but encouraged, one another and 
created a certain cachet around making money by cheating. 
In one series of exchanges, for instance, a Barclays trader in New York 
requested to a Barclays trader in London: 
This is the [book’s] risk.  We need low 1M and 3M libor.  Pls ask 
[submitter] to get 1M set to 82.  That would help a lot.72 
Submitters, who ultimately received the traders’ requests, would 
frequently agree to such requests: 
For you . . . anything . . . .73 
 
 66. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 20. 
 67. WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR:  FINAL REPORT 61 (2012) [hereinafter WHEATLEY 
REVIEW], https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
191762/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [perma.cc/63SD-CTJR]; see Gabriel 
Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory:  The Law, Promise, and Failure of Financial 
Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 16–17 (2013). 
 68. See WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 67, at 81. 
 69. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, 
34 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 183, 228 (2014); Jesse Colombo, This New Libor ‘Scandal’ 
Will Cause a Terrifying Financial Crisis, FORBES (June 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jessecolombo/2014/06/03/this-new-libor-scandal-will-cause-a-terrifying-financial-crisis 
[perma.cc/4SFL-BCU5]. 
 70. Awrey, supra note 69, at 229. 
 71. Id. (quoting settlement with the U.K. Financial Services Authority). 
 72. Complaint at 9, In re Barclays PLC, Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to 
Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Company Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and 
Imposing Remedial Sanctions, CFTC No. 12-25 (June 27, 2012) (quoting a March 27, 2006, 
exchange from a New York trader to a London trader). 
 73. Id. at 10 (quoting a March 16, 2006, exchange). 
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Always happy to help, leave it with me, Sir.74 
The Swiss bank UBS was also involved.75  The British Financial 
Services Authority found that traders at UBS made over 1000 requests to 
six different brokerage houses, and U.S. regulators found that UBS colluded 
with at least four other banks that contributed to the LIBOR panel.76  In a 
conversation between a UBS trader and a cash broker, the broker stated: 
mate yur getting bloody good at this libor game . . . think of me when yur 
on yur yacht in monaco wont yu.77 
In another instance, one trader remarked:  “Dude, I owe you big 
time! . . .  I’m opening a bottle of Bollinger.”78 
The evidence shows that LIBOR manipulation had become well-known 
and broadly accepted as normal at these global institutions.79  Indicative of 
the norm, rate manipulation among large global banks extended beyond 
LIBOR.  Traders at these institutions were also discovered to have 
manipulated the second most widely used benchmark, Euribor, as well as 
the Swiss Franc London Interbank Offered Rate.80 
Of particular note was the subsequent discovery of manipulation in the 
exchange market for forex.81  Like LIBOR, the forex market is enormous 
and touches trillions of dollars in transactions each day—in fact one 
financial commentator has referred to the forex market as “the biggest and 
the most interwoven one of them all.”82  Again, global banks including 
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and possibly 
 
 74. Id. (quoting a March 20, 2006, exchange). 
 75. In addition to those institutions where employees were proven to have manipulated 
LIBOR, others admitted attempts to manipulate it. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 
67, at 3. 
 76. Jill Treanor, UBS Libor Case Uncovers Tangled Web of Bank-Broker Relations, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/19/ 
ubs-libor-case-fine-emails [perma.cc/3XBN-RZGU]. 
 77. Plea Agreement at 24, United States v. UBS AG, No. 3:15-cr-76 (D. Conn. May 20, 
2015). 
 78. The Rotten Heart of Finance, supra note 65; see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 
THREATS TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 16 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ 
financial-services/publications/assets/pwc-gecs-2014-threats-to-the-financial-services-
sector.pdf (noting that “in the LIBOR case, employees [were] not encouraged to also 
challenge social conformity”) [perma.cc/5AE8-34DP]. 
 79. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 78, at 16. 
 80. See DAVID HOU & DAVID SKEIE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 
667, LIBOR:  ORIGINS, ECONOMICS, CRISIS, SCANDAL, AND REFORM 3 (2014); Tom Fairless, 
J.P. Morgan Fined by EU Regulators Over Rate Rigging, Operating Cartel, WALL STREET J. 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-fined-by-eu-regulators-
over-rate-rigging-operating-cartel-1413896931 [perma.cc/9LZT-XH38]. 
 81. See Chad Bray et al., Big Banks Are Fined $4.25 Billion in Inquiry into Currency-
Rigging, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (Nov. 12, 2014, 2:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billion-in-foreign-exchange-
scandal [perma.cc/MN2G-GLR2]; Six Banks Fined £2.6bn by Regulators Over Forex 
Failings, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30016007 
[perma.cc/ZKC5-NF2P]. 
 82. Bray et al., supra note 81. 
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UBS were involved in the manipulative misconduct.83  In 2014, 
government authorities uncovered that traders at these banks had been 
colluding to fix the prices of particular currencies for higher profits.84 
And again, the conduct was not only collusive, but also collaborative and 
collegial.85  By one account, a Citigroup trader made a profit of $99,000 in 
thirty-three seconds by coordinating with other brokers over a series of 
trades in the euro against the dollar.86  That trader worked with other traders 
to build up his book of trades, which enabled him to increase the price at a 
critical point in time when prices are set—known as the “fix”—above that 
which the trader had been paying all day in the open market.87  And traders 
at other firms helped the Citigroup trader do this.88 
This misconduct arguably impaired the integrity and soundness of the 
global financial markets in at least two different ways.  First, manipulating 
the benchmarks distorted the market equilibrium of numerous contracts.  
With trillions of dollars in derivatives, swaps, and loans referencing LIBOR 
alone, manipulating rates necessarily had consequences in the real 
economy.89  Perhaps most obviously, a falsely inflated LIBOR rate meant 
that any debt instrument in the world that referenced LIBOR as its 
benchmark became more expensive for the borrower—but not by the 
invisible hand of free market forces.  More broadly, as Hockett and 
Omarova suggest, by exploiting their influence over benchmarks, financial 
institutions can distort the “‘natural’ long-term equilibrium” that the market 
expects, causing other market actors to engage in a socially suboptimal 
number of transactions, in transactions on unfair or inefficient terms, or to 
interact in the marketplace in irrational or destabilizing ways when their 
suspicions of rate rigging are eventually confirmed.90 
Second, the fines imposed for wrongdoing may have weakened the 
culpable—but systemically important—banks.  In the past few years alone, 
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 86. See Bray et al., supra note 81. 
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1576 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
UBS was fined £940 million for its role in LIBOR;91 Deutsche Bank, also 
for its role in LIBOR, paid £227 million to the U.K.’s Financial Conduct 
Authority, $775 million to the U.S. Department of Justice, $800 million to 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and $600 million to the New 
York Department of Financial Services;92 UBS, J.P. Morgan Chase, HSBC, 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland, collectively, paid $4.25 billion in fines to 
U.S., British, and Swiss regulators for their involvement in forex 
rigging93—and the list goes on.94 
The weight of these fines—to say nothing of the related litigation 
expenses—has invariably cut into banks’ earnings and challenged them to 
keep up with their regulatory capital requirements.  As the European 
Systemic Risk Board has found in connection with the largest European 
banks, “Past fines and ones in the near future erase all the capital issued by 
EU globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) during the last five 
years.  The Common Equity Tier 1 ratios of these banks would be, on 
average, around two percentage points higher without such fines.”95  And as 
the results of the Fed’s 2014 supervisory stress tests show, losses associated 
with “operational risk” (most of which related to litigation losses) for 
twenty-five U.S. banks was about $150 billion over nine quarters.96  This 
suggests that misconduct-related fines directly impede banks’ ability to 
fortify their balance sheets against economic shocks as the post-Crisis 
framework intends.97  And to the extent that fines cause a bank to struggle 
to meet these capital requirements, the fines invariably divert the bank’s 
resources from other operational priorities, such as information 
infrastructure, internal compliance, and productive innovation. 
II.  A THEORY OF CONTAGION 
The burden of Part I was to anchor the concept of misconduct risk:  the 
possibility that misconduct, when widespread among financial institutions, 
gives rise to significant social and economic costs.  It urged that in these 
cases, misconduct is a macro (market-wide) risk that requires regulatory 
intervention—because the negative externalities that result from misconduct 
risk are neither concentrated in, nor fully internalized by, the individual 
institutions involved.  From that vantage point, just as regulators are 
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concerned about the mechanisms that transmit balance sheet distress 
between banks, so too should they be worried about the mechanisms that 
spread or synchronize misconduct in the banking sector.98 
Building on the case studies explored in Part I, Part II provides the 
second component of a framework for understanding misconduct risk.  
Specifically, Part II explores several possible structural or institutional 
reasons why misconduct risk arises.  First, Part II.A discusses three features 
of the banking sector that can enable misconduct on an industry-wide basis.  
Then, Part II.B explores the advantages of a regulatory strategy that targets, 
ex ante, structural sources of contagious misconduct. 
A.  Interbank Contagion 
What follows is a discussion of three structural or institutional aspects of 
the banking sector:  deficiencies in accountability, performance-based 
compensation, and the homogenous and hyperfluid nature of the banker 
labor market.  These features are likely to be key drivers of misconduct risk 
because, together in interaction, they have the potential to first incentivize, 
and then spread, misconduct across the financial services industry. 
1.  Accountability 
As a baseline, there may be certain deficiencies in accountability in the 
banking sector that decrease the likelihood that regulators or firm 
management will detect misconduct that goes on in deal teams or on trading 
floors.  Though not an exhaustive list, two such deficiencies stand out:  the 
lack of hierarchical responsibility at the managing director level and 
insufficient individual responsibility in connection with complex financial 
activities. 
a.  Hierarchy 
In general, banking lacks a formalized structure for holding managing 
directors responsible for the conduct of analysts, associates, and vice 
presidents below them.  Consider recent scandals involving the sale of MBS 
in the Crisis and the false submissions in LIBOR.  Legal accountability for 
the misconduct in those cases tended to concentrate at two ends of the 
hierarchical spectrum—with firm managers, like bank CEOs, at one end 
and relatively junior level bankers at the other.99  One important question is 
whether the managing directors who were not directly involved, but must 
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have (at least informally) signed off on this conduct, still remain in their 
jobs.100 
To the extent that banks did not hold managing directors accountable for 
the misconduct that they sanctioned or acknowledged during the Crisis or 
rate-fixing scandals, such lapse may reflect a lack of an industry-wide 
structure, policy, or ethical code that presumes managing directors are 
responsible for the conduct of their subordinates.  Instead, accountability 
may still be too fractured insofar as mid-level managers, like managing 
directors, are not systematically subject to serious professional or 
reputational consequences if and when their subordinates engage in 
misconduct. 
Such disconnect in professional responsibility may be unique to the 
banking profession.  Other skill-based professions, like law or medicine, 
recognize that senior practitioners are responsible (either formally or 
informally) for the professional choices of their less experienced junior 
colleagues.  In the practice of law, for example, well-established rules of 
professional conduct hold senior attorneys ethically responsible for the 
actions of their subordinates.101  In a similar ethos, medical doctors begin as 
residents and hone their skills under the supervision and guidance of 
attending physicians.  These supervising physicians are not just technical 
teachers, but also guide their subordinates with respect to ethical questions 
or conflicts.102  But in finance, as much a profession that deals in public 
trust as law and medicine, similar hierarchical accountability appears 
sparse. 
b.  Complexity 
Accountability may also be deficient where complexity is concerned—
and a good deal of banking today is highly complex.103  Broadly speaking, 
banks’ transactions today are multifaceted and multilayered.  Deals 
typically involve multiple teams within a bank and multiple bankers on 
each team.  It is rare in high finance today for any one (or two or three) 
individual to have ownership for all of the work streams in a transaction.  
While there may be a figurehead nominally running the deal, no one single 
banker is likely to be intimately familiar with all of its moving pieces.  
Consequently, when the big picture suggests that the transaction was tainted 
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with misrepresentation, omission, or manipulation, it can be difficult for 
management or regulators to hold individuals accountable, each of whom 
played only some small, nondispositive role. 
This diffusion of responsibility is perhaps most apparent in structured 
finance.  Recall that structured finance was at the heart of the Crisis.  It 
involved an asset bubble surrounding securitized mortgages, whereby banks 
packaged subprime mortgages into securities and then further packaged 
those securities into products like CDOs and CDS.  That process did not 
end with the Crisis—structured finance is alive and well today, while 
securitization is still a bread-and-butter process for banks.104 
And such complex financial activity wears accountability thin.  Not only 
does structured finance typically involve multiple layers of deal teams—all 
contributing their parts along the assembly line—but it also involves 
multiple stakeholders on the other side of the deal.  As Kate Judge has 
written, securitized products (and CDOs) “transform[]” traditional bilateral 
relationships between assets and investors into something more dispersed—
fragmented, as she terms it—in a way that increases and disperses the 
counterparties involved.105  At each stage in the structuring and 
restructuring process, counterparties become more removed from the 
underlying collateral, and therefore their incentives to gather information 
and monitor asset quality is further and further reduced.106  The result, 
overall, is a system of scattered responsibility on the securitization side 
combined with low levels of monitoring on the investor side, making any 
one individual banker’s perception of responsibility minimal at best.  
Indeed, the notion that the length of the “chain” is inversely related to 
accountability also finds support in the research of Alan Morrison, William 
Wilhelm, and their coauthors.107  Their empirical work suggests that the 
various technological shifts in the investment banking industry, which 
increased arm’s length transactions, ultimately lowered institutions’ 
concern for their reputations of propriety.108 
Together, these two accountability gaps—which flow from banks’ 
hierarchy and complexity—reduce the likelihood that misconduct will be 
detected.  By splintering responsibility for a transaction quite broadly, 
complexity makes it difficult to allocate responsibility appropriately.  
Again, this can reduce transparency, which, in turn, decreases the likelihood 
that any one group of stakeholders—in the bank or on the buy side—is 
sufficiently motivated to monitor for misconduct.  Similarly, a lack of 
hierarchical responsibility reduces the incentives for senior and experienced 
bankers to invest sufficient professional resources (i.e., time, mental energy, 
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creativity) in monitoring their deal teams and trading desks.  In the absence 
of sufficient resources dedicated to and with a capacity for monitoring for 
misconduct, bankers are more likely to estimate the risk that misconduct 
will be detected as relatively low. 
2.  Compensation 
If deficient accountability decreases the risks associated with engaging in 
legally or ethically questionable behavior, the compensation structures in 
banks can increase the potential reward.  The homogeneity of the largest 
global banks is key to understanding why.  Bank holding companies like 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,109 Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, HSBC, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, and others have nearly 
identical business lines:  commercial banking, securities underwriting, 
dealing and brokerage activities, investment management, and derivatives 
business.110  As a result, these banks recruit from a relatively homogenous 
labor pool of bankers and traders who are qualified with similar hard 
(quantitative) and soft (interpersonal) skills.111 
One byproduct of this homogeneity is an industry-wide standard of 
performance-based compensation, wherein the bulk of compensation is paid 
in the form of a discretionary annual bonus—rather than a fixed salary.  
This discretionary bonus is based on performance; it reflects some 
combination of how well the individual employee and the bank performed 
over the course of the year.  That compensation packages have become 
standardized across big banks, in the performance-based model, should not 
be surprising in light of their homogeneity:  a compensation package that 
achieves desired results in bank A (by motivating high performance) will 
also be likely to have the same result in bank B.  But performance-based 
compensation can produce socially suboptimal results as well.  Scholars 
like Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann have shown empirically that 
performance-based compensation gives rise to a moral hazard that 
incentivizes excessive risk taking.112  To the extent bankers are 
compensated with equity, they argue, bankers have incentives “to take 
gambles that have a negative present value but that, due to the insulation of 
common shareholders from downside risks, carry a positive expected value 
to these shareholders.”113 
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It should not be surprising that performance-based compensation can 
give rise to a similar set of incentives for misconduct.114  From an 
individual banker’s perspective, dispensing with ethical standards or 
manipulating prices or markets can, in the short term, yield higher (group, 
division, or institutional) profits that could result in higher compensation.  
Meanwhile, as discussed above, if accountability structures are deficient, 
the risk of detection may appear small.  And where detection of misconduct 
appears unlikely, the projected consequences of misconduct—professional 
or legal—will likewise seem negligible.  Overall, the result is that bankers 
and traders may be prone to a risk-reward calculus that rationalizes 
misconduct.  Stated differently, insofar as deficient accountability and a 
heavily performance-based compensation system are structural features of 
the industry, they have the potential not only to incentivize individual 
decisions to engage in misconduct, but also norms of misconduct in the 
global financial services sector. 
3.  Networks 
Together, as the foregoing discussion suggests, accountability 
deficiencies and performance compensation structures can rationalize 
misconduct for a profit-maximizing—even risk-averse—banker or trader in 
a large financial institution.  And to the extent accountability deficiencies 
and performance-based compensation are structural features of the industry 
as a whole, these incentive effects will arise simultaneously, affecting the 
cultural fabric of the industry, not only an individual’s actions.  Still, aside 
from the structural reasons why certain cultural norms of misconduct 
develop and stick, there is the additional question of how it is that these 
norms of misconduct can spread among financial institutions.  This 
phenomenon of misconduct contagion may very well perpetuate through 
networks in the banker labor market. 
a.  Institution Cycling  
The banker labor market is highly fluid and transient.  As Karen Ho 
documents in her ethnography of Wall Street investment banks, bankers use 
their “multiple connections,” “clout,” and “reputation” to move from one 
bank to another.115  As one of Ho’s analyst-interviewees explained the 
system:  “It’s very easy, especially for a senior person, to move from 
company A to company B.”116  And, after a time, “if they don’t like the 
company they’re working for or they don’t see eye-to-eye on the strategy, 
don’t like the individuals, they can probably move again.”117  It is also 
relatively common for junior bankers to move from institution to institution 
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—indeed, a junior-level transition is perhaps easier than transitioning is for 
a senior banker, given that their labor is relatively cheaper and skill set 
more malleable.  Combined with low levels of institutional loyalty, the 
turnover tradition in the industry creates a transient labor market.118 
The industry’s compensation structure—oriented around performance 
pay—is one possible reason for its fluidity.119  When a bank’s bonuses are 
announced in December or January, news among the various banks travels 
quickly.120  At that point, bankers begin to reassess their competitive 
position and the desirability of their current employment.121  Simply, banks 
that pay the highest bonuses become the most sought after employers.  And 
inasmuch as bankers seek higher bonus-paying banks, the banks also use 
lower bonuses to signal to low-performing employees that they should 
move elsewhere.122  In this environment, bankers will try to trade up, just as 
banks are competing with one another for top labor in a highly competitive 
labor market.  One straightforward result of this compensation-driven 
transience is that business practices or norms—including those involving 
misconduct—will also, with the bankers themselves, cycle through the 
various institutions. 
b.  Banker Networks 
Relatedly, as bankers move between institutions, they grow their social 
and professional networks.  By virtue of changing jobs (and changing them 
often), bankers have the ability to develop a wide, but close-knit, 
professional network.  These networks are then solidified through constant 
and repeating interbank professional interactions.  After all, much of the 
business of large, complex banks today is comprised of transactions with 
other banks.  Whereas traditionally the bulk of banks’ interactions involved 
simple lending and deposit-taking activities with consumers and companies, 
today complex banks lend and borrow substantially with other banks.123  
Bankers thus have substantial opportunity to build and maintain 
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professional bonds with their counterparts, who “play similar roles in the 
same network.”124 
In many cases, these professional networks strengthen already existing 
social networks.  As explained, bankers and traders are a relatively 
homogenous group.  Many have similar elite educational (as well as 
professional) backgrounds.  They tend to share personal characteristics as 
well, viewing themselves collectively as smart, aggressive, and 
successful.125  Over time, repeatedly hiring similar people into financial 
services jobs has a compounding effect—homophily; that is, similar people 
tend to gravitate toward one another.126  As such, this “elite kinship creates 
a bridge or network.”127  The effect is not only to connect bankers and 
traders, but also to connect the banks for whom they work:  “[I]ndividuals 
connected to the same organization are, in a sense, connected to each other 
through those organizations.  In the same way, organizations are connected 
to each other through the people they attract as members.”128  And these 
networks can serve as conduits for influence and norm transmission.129 
The impact of these networks may best be understood through a 
sociological frame and social network theory in particular, which teaches 
that people who are connected tend to influence one another’s behavior.130  
Indeed, variants of social network theory have been instructive in the 
corporate setting.  Relying on data from a 1985 study of Minneapolis 
CEOs, for example, Martin Kilduff and Wenpin Tsai hypothesized that the 
social connections that CEOs formed through membership in the same 
clubs and boards influenced their corporate decisions.131  In a similar vein, 
Cesare Fracassi has found a causal relationship between social ties and 
corporate finance decisions and thus argues that “companies are influenced 
in their policy decision making process by their nearest social 
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neighbors.”132  And more recently, corporate law scholars have paid 
significant attention to networks between interlocking boards of directors.  
Michal Barzuza and Quinn Curtis found in their 2013 study that the 
networks created between interlocking directors served to influence 
corporate decisions about director indemnification.133  Surveying this body 
of literature, John Bizjak and his coauthors concluded that “social 
networks . . . play an important role in facilitating the exchange of 
information between firms and in determining the types of practices 
adopted across firms and industries.”134  Overall, this research on CEO and 
board relationships, and the sociological theories on which it draws, gives 
one reason to think that the professional and social networks among bankers 
can serve as a conduit for interbank influence surrounding norms of 
misconduct.135 
In theory, then, banker networks may at least in part be responsible for 
the spreading of misconduct norms:  where profit- or reputational-driven 
misconduct takes hold in one corner of an institution, it can spread readily 
through these social and professional networks.  This contagious spreading 
can have a powerful normalizing effect, which can be seen in cases like 
LIBOR, where the traders involved appeared to believe that what they were 
doing was routine—not extraordinary or subversive.136  If so, the 
phenomenon whereby wrongdoing in a society becomes ordinary may also 
be at work in the global banking sector due in part to this networking effect.  
As Saira Mohamed points out in the international criminal law context, 
those who engage in reprehensible acts are often “regular people who 
succumb to the pressure of situational coercion[,] . . . people who had no 
prior intention to do anything wrong.”137 
Evidence does in fact suggest that misconduct in the banking sector may 
be situational, not a manifestation of a deep rotten character of the 
individuals involved.  In fact, one recent experiment on banking culture—
the first of its kind—found that when bankers’ professional identities were 
primed, they were more likely to act dishonestly than when they were 
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organizational actors are embedded within a network of relationships” and that “[t]hese 
ongoing social relationships provide the constraints and opportunities that, in combination 
with characteristics of individuals, issues, and organizations, may help explain unethical 
behavior in organizations”). 
 136. Sung Hui Kim has suggested that the key to understanding “extraordinary behavior” 
(i.e., misconduct) in a firm is to take account of what is perceived to be “ordinary behavior” 
among its employees. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud:  Re-Situating the Inside 
Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 997 (2005). 
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not.138  Ultimately, this suggests that holistic, ex ante structural regulation 
can be much more effective at reducing financial misconduct than ad hoc 
and reactive enforcement, which views misconduct as an individualized, 
even bad apples, type problem. 
B.  Structural Interventions 
A structural diagnosis leads naturally to a structural prescription, which, 
in contrast to traditional approaches to bank misconduct, can be forward 
looking in design while forging key partnerships between regulators and 
private market institutions. 
1.  Prophylactics 
Structural solutions lend themselves to preventive or prophylactic 
responses.  Whereas regulatory policies focused entirely on changing 
conduct through deterrence (i.e., conduct rules coupled with enforcement) 
tend to be reactionary and ex post, structural solutions can be proactive and 
ex ante.  By identifying the structures that tend to give rise to or manifest in 
misconduct, regulators can be forward looking in their approach—thinking 
creatively about what can be done to diagnose and then forestall risks that 
could contribute to the next crisis.  Applied here, such a forward-looking 
approach would involve tools that seek to modify gaps in accountability or 
suboptimal compensation structures in ways that might successfully prevent 
the incidence of misconduct in the first place.  It would also entail a better 
understanding of networks and their potential to spread business norms.  
Ultimately, when dealing with potentially systemic risks, a prophylactic 
approach is likely to be much less costly than sole reliance on ex post 
consequences, which are of little utility in a crisis situation.139 
In the universe of prophylactic options, focusing on structure appears at 
least in theory to be a more efficient use of limited regulatory resources 
than trying to change more amorphous problems like bank culture.  Very 
recently, as regulators have more seriously begun to appreciate the need for 
holistic approaches to misconduct, the conversation about misconduct in 
banks has become steeped in questions of culture.140  But having diagnosed 
misconduct as a cultural problem, regulators are now hard-pressed to find 
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satisfactory solutions within their existing toolkit.141  The Governor of the 
Bank of England, Mark Carney, has disclaimed the ability of public 
regulation to fix culture, stating that “[v]irtue cannot be regulated” and that 
“[e]ven the strongest supervision cannot guarantee good conduct.”142  
Likewise, Fed Chair Janet Yellen has conceded that “changing the culture 
of organizations is not something that we can achieve through 
supervision.”143 
Because a cultural diagnosis surpasses regulators’ institutional capacity 
for treatment, a cultural discourse implicitly puts the onus on banks to fix 
their own behavior.  While self-assessment and self-correction are no doubt 
necessary, the problem with an emphasis on culture is that it may ultimately 
take the problem almost entirely out of regulators’ hands.  Bringing 
structure to the fore, however, gives regulators an entry point for tackling 
what may at root be a cultural problem, but nonetheless has concrete 
drivers.  In sum, a regulatory strategy that focuses on structural problems 
and accompanying solutions has significant normative and practical appeal.  
Structural weaknesses can be relatively well-defined and progress toward 
reform observable even if not perfectly measurable at first.  Such strategy 
also lends itself to a complementarity approach, whereby regulators expend 
their resources in areas in which they have a comparative advantage, while 
leveraging the knowledge and resources of the private sector where their 
capacities fall short. 
2.  Complementarity 
Regulatory tools that engage the private market reflect what some 
scholars have referred to as a “complementarity” approach, which neither 
delegates regulatory authority (in a classic private ordering sense) nor relies 
wholly on top-down approaches or “belt-and-suspenders style 
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duplication.”144  Regulators and the private market work in tandem, each 
expending their resources according to their relative strengths. 
In a similar but slightly more self-regulatory vein, other scholars, like 
Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, have developed a regulatory theory of 
“management-based regulation”145 (MBR).  The general idea of MBR is 
closely related to the notion of complementarity:  regulators specify an 
objective, but then allow firms to self-evaluate and develop a set of internal 
rules that are consistent with achieving the regulator’s objectives.146  So, for 
example, under an MBR model, the EPA requires regulated industries that 
use certain chemicals “to develop risk management plans” for their use.147  
And the FDA requires food processors “to use a flow chart to evaluate 
production process[], identify possible sources of [pathogen] contamination, 
and evaluate and implement alternatives for reducing contamination 
risk.”148  In one analogous setting, legislation surrounding the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act mandates that firms implement control systems that 
provide “reasonable assurances” that the use of corporate assets will not be 
used for improper means in foreign business transactions.149  This approach 
reflects the realization that “U.S. regulators lack[] the enforcement 
resources to police business units in far-flung corners of a globalized 
economy.”150 
One can readily see how defining the problem as structural is conducive 
to complementarity-style regulatory tools.  Indeed, as in these other 
contexts, if not more so, complementarity is ideally suited to the problems 
presented by misconduct in complex financial institutions.  For one, 
regulators are often handicapped when it comes to assessing large banks’ 
vulnerabilities to misconduct.151  As the Crisis taught us, regulators 
frequently lack the real-time information to anticipate the types of activity 
that may lead to misconduct until significant damage is done.152  Similarly, 
given the complexity of the industry, regulators tend to lag behind the 
private sector in their expertise with new or emerging financial products 
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and strategies, making it difficult for them to anticipate where misconduct 
might creep in.153  Finally, when it comes to devising solutions to 
misconduct in banks, as outsiders, it is likely challenging for regulators to 
accurately assess which types of internal firm structures, policies, or 
systems would be more or less effective at reducing misconduct. 
The relative strengths of the private market in all of these areas suggest 
two things for regulatory design.  First, the private market is in the better 
position to know precisely how to address the industry’s structural 
problems relating to accountability gaps and the ways in which 
compensation may create perverse incentives.  Second, attempting to devise 
top-down rules for banks with respect to their conduct may, like so much 
financial regulation, focus on past examples of misconduct, while failing to 
anticipate future problems.  Regulation by fiat thus runs the risk of being 
misdirected or counterproductive.  Arguably, then, the most productive use 
of finite regulatory resources is for regulators to identify a general objective 
and then to leverage the private sector’s insights and resources to develop 
and implement the solution. 
Complementarity approaches are not only desirable because they 
efficiently allocate regulatory resources, but also because they tend to be 
parsimonious in scope.  Regulatory tools that work in concert with existing 
private market efforts will naturally be less costly than either top-down 
rules that aim to mandate or preclude certain conduct, or ex post 
enforcement actions that seek to shape behavior through punishment and 
deterrence.  And managing the added costs of regulation is becoming 
increasingly important in the post-Crisis regulatory order.  Five years into 
the new regime, various unintended consequences and negative side effects 
of the ever-expanding regulatory framework are beginning to surface.154  
As the regulatory ground continues to shift and the ultimate effects of this 
new framework remain unknown, prudence counsels caution when 
contemplating regulatory expansion. 
In sum, a regulatory strategy that focuses on the various structural 
aspects of the banking sector that incentivize and then spread misconduct 
has normative appeal as a resource-wise prophylactic with potential to 
reduce misconduct risk.  The next part critiques the current regulatory 
framework for missing this opportunity—by focusing on the quantitative 
risks that banks pose and deploying an almost exclusively capital-oriented 
arsenal of regulatory tools.  It then suggests how this framework might be 
revised to incorporate the use of innovative regulatory tools, which would 
better reflect the theoretical insights offered in Parts I and II. 
III.  REBALANCING THE BASEL REGIME 
Until this point, the goal of this Article has been to establish a framework 
for regulators to understand how and under what circumstances misconduct 
risk arises.  This Article illustrated the potential for misconduct to generate 
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economic and social costs (and even contribute to systemic risk) in Part I 
and theorized the structural roots of misconduct risk in Part II.  The balance 
of this Article addresses some remaining questions of regulatory and 
institutional design.  The principal goal of Part III is to critique the Basel 
regime—which sets international standards for global banks—as 
insufficiently addressed to the problem of misconduct risk. 
To that end, Part III.A briefly describes the current Basel framework, 
highlighting the problems with its predominantly quantitative approach to 
managing risk in banks.  Part III.B and III.C then offer a potential path 
toward a more balanced Basel regime, that is, one that weighs quantitative 
risks alongside the qualitative risks posed by misconduct in an effort to 
reach a more efficient regulatory equilibrium.  Part III.B suggests a new 
supervisory tool that may be effective at reducing misconduct risk in global 
banks—compliance stress testing—and Part III.C proposes a way to offset 
capital ratios where such a supervisory tool is adopted.  These suggestions 
in Part III.B and III.C are necessarily preliminary in nature and mainly 
intended not as a silver bullet, but to prompt conversation about the optimal 
balance between the capital regulation and supervision of globally active 
banks. 
A.  Regulating Capital 
Basel III was the international regulatory community’s response to the 
Crisis.155  It responded to concerns that the pre-Crisis capital regime had 
been far too lax.156  Its heightened capital and liquidity requirements were 
thus intended as a “comprehensive set of reform[s]” to “strengthen the 
regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.”157 
1.  Basel’s Pillars 
Basel III uses capital and liquidity requirements both to incentivize more 
prudent risk taking and to shore up a firm’s defenses (i.e., its cushion) 
against potential future losses.  In other words, the Basel regime relies on 
quantitative restrictions both to reduce the likelihood of a shock in the first 
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instance, by attempting to reduce risk in the financial system, and to guard 
against possible contagion, by ensuring that shocks can be contained.  To 
that end, although Basel III, like the Basel II regime before it, included 
three pillars of reform—oriented around capital, supervision, and market 
discipline—the “centerpiece” of this regime is the capital-focused Pillar 
1.158 
The Pillar 1 reforms imposed an across-the-board increase in the quality 
and quantity of regulatory capital that banks are required to hold.  
Previously under Basel II, banks were required to maintain 4 percent of 
their risk-weighted assets in so-called Tier 1 capital (the safest and most 
liquid forms of capital).159  Basel III now requires them to retain 6 percent 
of that valuable Tier 1 capital—and of that, 4.5 percent in common 
equity.160  Basel III introduced several new additional requirements, beyond 
the standard minimum capital rules.  For one, it added a countercyclical 
capital buffer, which requires banks to increase their regulatory capital an 
additional 2.5 percent during periods of strong economic growth.161  
National authorities have additional discretion to require even more 
conservation during such periods of credit growth.162  It also added a 2.5 
percent conservation buffer that can be drawn down in times of stress.163  
And as an additional measure for the largest global banks, Basel III 
developed a capital surcharge for “too big to fail” institutions.164  The 
consequence of breaching capital requirements is, among other things, 
regulatory restrictions on an institution’s ability to pay dividends and 
repurchase shares.165 
Basel III also added three “backstop” measures to complement the risk-
based capital requirements.166  One is a new leverage ratio (also subsumed 
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under Pillar 1), which is set at three percent of capital to total assets.167  The 
second two reforms, ancillary but outside of Pillar 1, deal with liquidity.  
Pursuant to a “Liquidity Coverage Ratio,” banks must now maintain enough 
liquid assets to withstand a thirty-day funding freeze.168  And a “net stable 
funding ratio” further requires banks to maintain adequate levels of long-
term sources of funding, such as long-term debt and deposits, to counteract 
their pre-Crisis tendency to over-rely on short-term sources of wholesale 
funding, such as repurchase agreements or “repos.”169  Though 
implementation is not yet complete (with a timetable running through 
2019), so far, regulators both in the United States and abroad have begun to 
implement Basel III’s various requirements.170 
Pillars 2 and 3, on supervision and market discipline respectively, should 
in theory address issues surrounding misconduct, but are actually quite 
weak on those scores.  Even the most recent Pillar 2 and 3 reforms only 
obliquely deal with misconduct.  Pillar 3 added new disclosure 
requirements to improve market discipline, which were finalized in January 
2015.171  These requirements purport to “enable market participants to 
access key information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk 
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exposures in order to increase transparency and confidence about a bank’s 
exposure to risk.”172  But these revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements do 
not specifically mention misconduct as a distinct type of risk to be 
disclosed.173 
Pillar 2, on supervision, does speak to corporate governance more 
generally and envisions a role for supervisors in “foster[ing] good corporate 
governance in banks.”174  Still, the July 2015 revisions to these Pillar 2 
principles provide little guidance on how supervisors can regulate 
misconduct as a risk.  They provide barely a page on compliance and a few 
pages suggesting how supervisors should oversee boards and senior 
management.175  Ultimately, as a document that provides “guidance,” these 
Pillar 2 principles are likely to remain in Pillar 1’s shadow, with relatively 
less attention and commitment from national regulators than Pillar 1’s 
capital rules have garnered. 
2.  Operational Risk 
At best, Basel addresses misconduct in its framework for operational 
risk—which is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”176  
Though the interpretation of that definition varies, the Basel Committee 
appears to have intended it to refer to a wide range of unanticipated and 
exogenous risks to the business.177  Core examples of operational risk 
include external fraud (like hacking), workplace safety or hardware failures, 
or data entry errors.178  As far as employee misbehavior is concerned, 
operational risk includes the possibility of bank losses that arise from rogue 
or aberrational behavior, like employee theft or presumably other kinds of 
ultra vires activity.179  Pursuant to Basel II operational risk requirements 
(left intact and unmodified by Basel III), banks are responsible for 
calculating this component of risk, using a combination of historical data 
and information about the bank’s business environment and its internal 
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control systems.180  Banks are then assessed an additional capital surcharge 
based on that estimate.181 
As a tool for treating misconduct risk, however, operational risk is wide 
of the mark.  To begin, operational risk is a crude (indeed inaccurate) proxy 
for genuine misconduct risk, as the two are qualitatively quite different.  
Whereas operational risk is concerned with the possibility of financial loss 
to the institution, misconduct risk addresses potential economic harm to the 
system (like bubbles and crises, distorted markets, and decreased consumer 
and interbank lending).  Because their focal points are very different—
operational risk on the firm and misconduct risk on the market—the two 
risk categories overlap only slightly—and in many cases, not at all.182  As a 
result, operational risk does not focus banks or regulators on the varied 
types of misconduct that can have market-distorting potential and certainly 
not on the industry-wide structural drivers of misconduct.  Consequently, 
this Basel risk category captures at best only a fraction of the type of 
socially suboptimal behavior that can give rise to misconduct risk.  It is, 
overall, an antiquated view of misconduct that has not been updated to 
reflect the post-Crisis macroprudential approach. 
The distinction is deeper than definitional.  Even if Basel were to expand 
its conception of operational risk to include these various aspects of 
misconduct risk, fundamental problems would still remain.  For one, as 
currently understood, operational risk assumes that banks can accurately 
identify and estimate, based on historical incidents, the likelihood that 
misconduct will expose them to future loss.  But such a premise ignores the 
evolving and complex nature of misconduct and the resulting reality that 
past incidents will not accurately predict current vulnerabilities.  Moreover, 
even if firms did correctly estimate their internal vulnerability to 
misconduct, human behavior (overconfidence and hubris) suggests that they 
are likely to improperly revise downward that estimate.  Under the existing 
“advanced approaches” regime, large banks are not only permitted to 
calculate their own operational risk based on historical incidents, they are 
then entitled to adjust the final calculation based on a self-assessment of the 
effectiveness of their internal controls.183  This discretion and subjectivity 
 
 180. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OPERATIONAL RISK—
SUPERVISORY GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCED MEASUREMENT APPROACHES (2011), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs196.pdf [perma.cc/FAQ4-KJYH]. 
 181. See Maike Sundmacher, Operational Risk Capital Charges for Banks:  
Consideration and Consequences, (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963227 [perma.cc/VG8L-LADT]. 
 182. For example, operational risk would likely not capture any unethical distortion of 
information that took place in global banks in the years preceding the Crisis, even though 
that conduct may have had a macroeconomically destabilizing effect (as well as legal and 
reputational costs to the firm). 
 183. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 180, at 51. But see JOINT 
COMM. EUR. SUPERVISORY AUTHS., JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT ON RISKS AND 
VULNERABILITIES IN THE EU FINANCIAL SYSTEM 13 (2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/ 
documents/10180/950548/JC+2015+007+JC+Report+on+Risks+and+Vulnerabilities+in+the
+EU+Financial+System.pdf (recommending supervisory benchmarks for conduct risk within 
the operational risk framework) [perma.cc/T8DB-Q457].  Moreover, using historical losses 
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thus enables banks to overestimate the efficacy of their internal control 
systems, while underestimating the risk of misconduct-related loss, arriving 
at risk estimates in various and unpredictable ways. 
Ultimately, the inadequacy of operational risk goes to the root of the 
Basel critique.  Operational risk reflects Basel’s bedrock assumption about 
managing risk in banks:  that risk can be controlled, or at least reduced, by 
imposing higher capital adequacy requirements.  But there are limits to 
what capital can accomplish as a regulatory tool.  The diagnosis of 
misconduct as a market-wide risk implicates a complicated interaction 
between accountability, compensation, and networks in banks that can, in 
combination, give rise to norms of misconduct that spread broadly.  While 
increasing capital ratios might marginally increase institutional incentives 
to improve internal control systems, it seems quite unlikely to effect a 
meaningful revision of individual and group incentives on the ground—at 
the deal team and trading floor levels. 
Overall, Basel’s emphasis on quantitative, measureable risk has resulted 
in a failure of imagination about how to regulate misconduct risk.184  The 
Basel regime has focused regulators and academics on quantifiable—known 
and observable—risks.  It has largely disregarded the structural drivers and 
contagions of misconduct and, consequently, failed to broker international 
regulatory cooperation to combat its industry-wide spread.185  The 
remainder of this Article suggests one possible way of incorporating 
misconduct risk more prominently into the Basel regime, while mindful of 
institutions’ overall regulatory burden. 
B.  Regulating Conduct 
Thus far, this Article has urged that misconduct is an underappreciated 
source of market-wide risk.  This section now suggests a way to introduce 
misconduct as a risk priority in the Basel III regime.  To that end, this 
section argues that Basel III should adopt new supervisory requirements 
aimed at misconduct risk.  What follows is a preliminary design proposal 
for such a supervisory tool. 
 
to calculate operational risk is inherently backward looking. See Mehrsa Baradaran, 
Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1279 (2014) (noting that banks’ 
internal risk assessment has historically failed to account for “black swan”—i.e., low 
probability, high magnitude—events); Krawiec, supra note 114, at 130 (noting that “[t]he 
nature and scarcity of some types of operational loss events, combined with the relatively 
preliminary state of operational risk modeling, means that the enforcement arm of this 
particular enforced self-regulatory regime is apt to be lacking”). 
 184. Some scholars have argued that the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, which was 
also aimed at curtailing systemic risk, had too little to say on misconduct and, specifically, 
the board’s oversight of financial firms’ compliance function. See Johnson, supra note 11. 
 185. See Romano, supra note 15, at 25 (observing that Basel is not focused on unknown 
or unknowable risk). 
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1.  Bank Compliance 
A preliminary question is whether regulatory intervention to manage 
misconduct risk is necessary in light of existing private market efforts.  To 
be sure, global banks have made considerable effort in recent years to 
expand their compliance departments.186  Generally speaking, a bank’s 
compliance function serves two main purposes.  First, compliance is 
supposed to ensure that bankers adhere to laws and regulation.  As the 
Basel Committee describes it, compliance is “[a]n independent function that 
identifies, assesses, advises on, monitors and reports on” the range of risks 
associated with failure to comply with “applicable laws, regulations, codes 
of conduct and standards of good practice.”187  Its second purpose is to 
propagate ethical norms throughout the firm.188 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in the wake of recent misconduct scandals, 
banks’ compliance departments have exploded.189  So quickly has 
compliance ramped in the past few years that the Wall Street Journal has 
referred to it as one of the “hotter” careers in America today.190  J.P. 
Morgan and HSBC—the two largest G-SIBS—have alone made enormous 
expenditures.  J.P. Morgan employed more than 8000 employees for anti-
money laundering compliance alone in 2014 (and planned to add 13,000 for 
compliance overall),191 and in 2013, HSBC added 1600 new compliance 
employees.192  Aside from expanding manpower, banks have also begun to 
experiment with new ideas for making compliance effective.  Barclays, for 
example, created a compliance “academy” in partnership with a U.K. 
business school.193  And recent industry surveys confirm that many 
institutions have restructured their compliance departments so that the chief 
 
 186. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act requires large financial institutions to have 
a compliance framework. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, Relationship with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 12 C.F.R. § 248, 
subpart D (2014). 
 187. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS 3 
(2003) (emphasis omitted), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs103.pdf [perma.cc/ARQ7-7F78]. 
 188. Baer, supra note 11, at 959.  Compliance can be thought of as a subset of enterprise 
risk management, which is more generally concerned with the firm’s mechanisms for 
“agency cost control,” among other risks to the business. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. LAW. 967, 981 (2009). 
 189. Much of this compliance initiative has been driven by requirements in deferred 
prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements, which condition forbearance on 
compliance reform. See Griffith, supra note 11. 
 190. Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer:  Dream Career?, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330 
204579250722114538750 [perma.cc/3E4S-3XL2]. 
 191. Rachel Louise Ensign, Lenders Bolster Risk and Compliance Staff, WALL STREET J. 
(May 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579531263107 
487566 [perma.cc/PG32-KUSS]. 
 192. Millman & Rubenfeld, supra note 190. 
 193. Barclays Sets Up Elite Compliance Academy, FIN. TIMES:  FASTFT (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/fastft/2014/07/03/post-176152/ [perma.cc/UA3Y-K5TH]. 
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compliance officer (CCO) reports directly to the board of directors (rather 
than to a chief legal officer or the management team).194 
However, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons that suggest 
banks do (and will) underinvest in compliance.  First, as an empirical 
matter, the timeline of events since the Crisis supports that supposition.  
Even after regulators disciplined banks for their behavior in the Crisis—
through investigations (which impose costs irrespective of the conclusion 
on wrongdoing), historically large civil fines, criminal prosecutions, and 
deferred prosecution agreements—misconduct in banks continued.  As 
earlier discussed, banks continued to manipulate LIBOR and other 
benchmarks through 2012.195 
Then, even after regulators detected banks’ LIBOR misconduct, they 
discovered that banks were manipulating the forex markets.  Indeed, as the 
Economist aptly noted, the timing of “the currency-market 
skullduggery . . . suggests banks were slow to clean up the rotten culture on 
their trading floors, or that they genuinely thought their colluding ways had 
been officially endorsed.”196  More recently, incidents involving known or 
alleged international money laundering,197 tax evasion,198 corruption,199 
 
 194. A 2015 survey by Deloitte found that of its 364 respondent institutions, 57 percent 
report that their CCO reports directly to either the CEO or the board (reflecting an upward 
trend from previous years), and 55 percent regularly brief the board on ethics and culture. 
DELOITTE, COMPLIANCE WEEK:  IN FOCUS:  2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 5 (2015), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-reg-crs-
2015-compliance-trends-survey-051515.pdf [perma.cc/J3CP-DK5Q].  A 2014 Accenture 
survey found that nearly one-third of their respondents had compliance reporting to the 
board and 40 percent to the CEO. Compliance’s Seat at the Table—Hard to Earn, Hard to 
Retain, ACCENTURE CONSULTING, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-2014-
compliance-risk-study-banking-summary (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/2PHD-
ATFV]. 
 195. Notably, at least three of the global banks that received federal bailouts were also 
involved or alleged to be involved in the LIBOR scandal. See Bailed Out Banks, 
CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2016) [perma.cc/8E2J-ABYJ]; Trefis Team, FDIC Sues 16 Global Banks for Roles 
in Manipulating LIBOR, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
greatspeculations/2014/03/18/fdic-sues-16-global-banks-for-roles-in-manipulating-libor 
[perma.cc/XUK8-Y3VJ]. 
 196. Bank, Fix Thyself, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/ 
finance-and-economics/21598678-bank-england-faces-questions-over-its-role-rigged-forex-
deals-bank-fix?fsrc=rss|fec [perma.cc/94GF-M6E7]. 
 197. See, e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign & Max Colchester, HSBC Struggles in Battle 
Against Money Laundering, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/hsbc-struggles-in-battle-against-money-laundering-1421100133 [perma.cc/Q93S-
CS5B]; HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist 
Financing Risks, HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS:  PERM. SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS (July 16, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/ 
media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks 
[perma.cc/A7LB-KLR3]; Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Seeks to Compensate Victims of BNP 
Paribas Violations, WALL STREET J. (May 1, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/ 
2015/05/01/u-s-seeks-to-compensate-victims-of-bnp-paribas-violations [perma.cc/R76P-
9T6X]. 
 198. See, e.g., John Letzing, HSBC Hit by Fresh Details of Tax Evasion Claims, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-hit-by-fresh-details-of-tax-
evasion-claims-1423482612 [perma.cc/7RHQ-9MYW]. 
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and the manipulation of the swaps market200 have also come to light.  And 
although these later incidents of misconduct did not give rise to systemic 
consequences, per se, they nonetheless circumstantially suggest that banks 
may lack sufficient incentives to invest adequate resources in 
compliance.201 
From a strategy perspective, there is also some reason to think that 
banks’ compliance efforts are still too uncreative.202  For example, a 2015 
Deloitte survey of 364 global firms found that the three most common 
responsibilities of a CCO are compliance training, code of conduct, and the 
whistleblower hotline.203  These tasks, while important, are all inward 
looking and surface level.  None of these goals proactively targets the 
potential ways in which misconduct can spread.  Basic compliance, it 
seems, ignores the larger question of how misconduct can be transmitted in 
and out of a bank.  Without digging deeper, standard compliance programs 
such as these will not become agile enough to address the reasons why 
incentive structures, accountability systems, labor markets, or interbank 
networks perpetuate misconduct risk throughout the banking sector. 
Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, regulators should worry that 
banks’ efforts, no matter how seemingly robust, will be insufficient from a 
social welfare perspective.  As Steven Schwarcz explains, regulatory 
intervention is almost always appropriate where systemic risks are 
concerned because “banks . . . will protect themselves but not the stability 
of the banking system.”204  With misconduct also, the social costs of a 
market failure to rein in misconduct risk—including contraction of liquidity 
in the interbank market, contract and asset-price distortion, and possibly 
even asset bubbles205—extend beyond the costs experienced by individual 
financial institutions. 
The problem can be framed in terms of cost internalization:  a 
misbehaving bank bears only a fraction of the resulting costs.  To the extent 
the misconduct is profitable, bankers/traders can benefit from misconduct in 
the short and medium term, but bear only a fraction (if any) of the longer-
term costs; those are imposed on other firms, the industry, and the economy 
 
 199. See, e.g., Chris Cumming, FIFA Scandal Will Test Banks’ Anti-Money-Laundering 
Liability, AM. BANKER (May 28, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/national-
regional/fifa-scandal-will-test-banks-anti-money-laundering-liability-1074580-1.html 
[perma.cc/S5Q7-4SL9]. 
 200. See, e.g., Katy Burne, Big Banks Agree to Settle Swaps Lawsuit, WALL STREET J. 
(Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-wall-street-groups-agree-to-settle-
credit-swaps-antitrust-case-1441988741 [perma.cc/NNV9-4NE8]. 
 201. See Baer, supra note 11, at 952 (noting that today “corporations are no more 
transparent or ethical than their predecessors”).  Moreover, even if enforcement authorities in 
the United States and Europe may be highly focused on compliance today, once the agreed-
to compliance reforms are made, enforcement’s focus will naturally move elsewhere. See 
Griffith, supra note 11 (describing the increase in compliance mandated in nonprosecution 
and deferred prosecution agreements). 
 202. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487, 491 (2003). 
 203. DELOITTE, supra note 194, at 5. 
 204. Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206. 
 205. See supra Part I (discussing macroeconomic costs associated with misconduct). 
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more broadly.  Thus typical, rational bank managers may choose to 
underinvest in measures to reduce misconduct among their employees.206  
On that rationale, it may be both socially desirable and economically 
productive for regulators to intervene in the private market to ensure that 
banks spend a sufficient amount of their limited strategic and financial 
resources on compliance.207 
2.  Supervising Compliance 
The preceding sections provided a descriptive and theoretical account of 
why regulatory intervention in banking conduct is desirable.  This section 
offers a preliminary policy proposal as to how bank regulators might do so 
within the Basel III framework.  Specifically, Basel III’s Pillar 2 
admonishes national supervisors to have an “effective system of banking 
supervision.”208  The following proposal joins two supervisory tools that 
Pillar 2 endorses—compliance programs and stress testing—to suggest how 
supervision might be more effectively used to address misconduct risk in 
the global banking sector:  through compliance stress testing. 
Stress testing is a well-established supervisory tool.  It essentially 
involves a review of how well a bank can withstand a hypothetical scenario 
of stress; and that assessment is generally oriented around capital—what a 
bank’s balance sheet looks like after experiencing a test shock.  After the 
Crisis, many national regulators required global banks to conduct company-
run stress tests, the results of which are used to inform bank supervision.209  
Basel’s Pillar 2 in fact provided guidance on how national regulators should 
supervise these internal stress tests (as written in the Basel II regime).210 
In addition to institution-run stress tests, bank regulators also began to 
stress test banks a few years after the Crisis.  Now, many national regulators 
conduct supervisory stress testing that is not necessarily required by Basel 
III.211  In the United States, the Fed conducts a supervisory stress test, 
formally called the “Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review” 
 
 206. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 206 (referring to a tragedy of the commons type 
situation with respect to banks’ incentive to minimize systemic risk). 
 207. Ongoing supervision on the federal level is an important, arguably necessary 
supplement to duties imposed by state corporate law. See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961–62, 969 (Del Ch. 1996). 
 208. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING 
SUPERVISION 10 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs213.pdf [perma.cc/T4FJ-6YF2]. 
 209. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS 
TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION (2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.pdf 
(providing guidance for banks’ stress testing practices) [perma.cc/XR5D-H74T]; see also 
Baradaran, supra note 183, at 128–88 (providing a history of stress testing); Dodd-Frank Act 
Stress Test (Company-Run), OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/tools-
forms/forms/bank-operations/stress-test-reporting.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 
[perma.cc/6WWU-S8BG]. 
 210. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 209, at 18. 
 211. In the United States, the first stress test (the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program) was conducted on nineteen U.S.-owned bank holding companies in 2009. HIRTLE 
& LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 9.  Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), 
now an annual exercise, began in 2011. Id. at 16.  The 2014 CCAR tested thirty bank 
holding companies with assets of at least $50 billion. Id. 
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(CCAR), on large American bank holding companies and foreign bank 
subsidiaries.212  The European Banking Authority (EBA) also conducts 
stress tests biannually, with a transparency exercise performed in off 
years.213  And the Bank of England also conducts a stress test to assess the 
system-wide health of the U.K. financial sector.214  For these central bank 
regulators, the purpose of the supervisory stress test is to produce a 
“quantitative view” of a bank under a hypothetical scenario of “adverse 
external events, such as changes in real estate or capital markets prices, or 
unanticipated deterioration in a borrower’s repayment capacity.”215 
These annual or biannual tests involve banks’ submission of a “capital 
plan” to their supervisors, which includes information about the bank’s 
governance over those plans.216  With that information, supervisors then 
model projected bank losses and incomes in the event of the hypothetical 
scenario of stress.217  Stress testing thus serves as a forward-looking, 
prophylactic tool; it is a “diagnostic” that is used to “drive the design of 
future regulation.”218 
 
 212. This Article limits its discussion of U.S. stress testing to the CCAR.  The Fed is also 
responsible for administering the Dodd-Frank Act stress tests (DFAST). Id. at 12–16.  
DFAST has only a quantitative component. Id. 
 213. Letter from Andrea Enria, Chairperson, Eur. Banking Auth., to Martin Schulz, Pres., 
Eur. Parliament, Decision by the EBA Board of Supervisors Regarding an EU-Wide Stress 
Test in 2015 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/999733/ 
EBA+letter+to+EP++EC++and+Council+-+Decision+EU-wide+stress+test+2015.pdf 
[perma.cc/KX9A-MG6Q]. 
 214. See BANK OF ENG., STRESS TESTING THE UK BANKING SYSTEM:  2015 RESULTS 5 
(2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/results011215.pdf 
(noting that the 2015 stress scenario “represents a coherent tail-risk scenario designed 
specifically to assess the resilience of UK banks” and in particular to assess their capital 
adequacy in light of the hypothetical adverse shock) [perma.cc/Q5RJ-4B4Y]; see also Oliver 
Burrows et al., RAMSI:  A Top-Down Stress Testing Model Developed at the Bank of 
England, 52 Q. BULL. 204, 204–05 (2012). 
 215. ROBERT LONG, SR. EXAMINATION SPECIALIST, FDIC, STRESS TESTING AND MODEL 
GOVERNANCE 5 (2013) (on file with author); see HIRTLE & LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 2; 
see also Baradaran, supra note 183, at 1283–88 (explaining how stress tests in the United 
States work). 
 216. HIRTLE & LEHNERT, supra note 165, at 16.  Capital plans generally include 
a detailed description of the firm’s internal capital planning process and 
governance over that process; its capital policy governing capital actions such as 
dividends, repurchases, and share issuance; its planned capital actions for the next 
nine quarters under both baseline and stressed economic conditions; and a set of 
company-run stress test projections under three scenarios provided by the Federal 
Reserve . . . and under two bank-determined scenarios, including a baseline and 
“BHC stress” scenario intended to stress the firm’s unique vulnerabilities based on 
its portfolio and business focus. 
Id. at 16–17. 
 217. See Baradaran, supra note 183, at 1287. 
 218. Id. at 1286; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT 
STRESS TEST 2013:  SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 3 (2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_20130314.pdf 
[perma.cc/6GX3-QC8B]. 
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The Fed’s CCAR also includes a qualitative component.219  Unlike the 
quantitative component that involves a hypothetical scenario with 
objectively measurable results, the qualitative component appears to 
involve more evaluation than simulation.220  In general, it is focused on 
how well a bank’s “capital planning process appropriately captures the 
specific risks and vulnerabilities faced by the firm under stress.”221  In 
2015, the Fed was especially focused on the comprehensiveness of a bank’s 
“process for identifying the full range of relevant risks arising from its 
exposures and business mix.”222  The qualitative component also considers 
how well banks implement internal stress testing models, based on their 
own “unique vulnerabilities arising from their particular business 
strategies.”223  But the qualitative aspect of the CCAR stress tests has not, 
to date, been highly focused on banks’ processes for assessing and 
managing misconduct risk through their compliance infrastructure.  
Expanding qualitative stress testing in this direction could, however, 
provide bank supervisors with an ongoing institutional framework for 
evaluating banks’ resilience against misconduct risk. 
In particular, qualitative stress testing could be used to test the strength of 
banks’ compliance functions, as a proxy for assessing a bank’s 
susceptibility to misconduct risk—that is, by testing the likelihood that 
misconduct will originate from or be imported to that bank.  While there are 
 
 219. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2016:  SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS 15–16 (2016). 
 220. HIRTLE & LENHERT, supra note 165, at 17 (noting that the “qualitative component 
involves assessments of the firms’ internal processes for determining how much capital they 
need to have”).  As one commentator sarcastically remarked, failing the Fed’s stress tests for 
qualitative reasons is “when the Fed rejects your capital plan not because it leaves you with 
too little capital, but because it thinks you’re generally inept at capital planning, or doesn’t 
like the smug look on your face during this stress test.” Matt Levine, Goldman Sachs Is 
Cutting It Close on the Stress Test, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-11/goldman-sachs-is-cutting-it-close-on-
the-stress-test [perma.cc/TKJ4-XMAL]. 
 221. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
AND REVIEW 2015:  ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 7 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 
CCAR RESULTS], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20150311a1 
.pdf [perma.cc/HH6G-TDYY]; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014:  SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
GUIDANCE 24–25 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
bcreg20131101a2.pdf [perma.cc/RLD4-8JD5]; Peter Eavis, U.S. Banks Pass Stress Tests, 
Some with an Asterisk, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/03/12/business/dealbook/us-banks-pass-stress-tests-but-not-without-some-
checkmarks.html?_r=0 (reporting that Deutsche Bank and Santander failed for qualitative 
reasons in 2015 “because of broad and deep deficiencies in how they planned for adverse 
market conditions and an economic downturn”) [perma.cc/MW9E-WRGT].  As Governor 
Tarullo has explained, the qualitative assessment of CCAR includes “the extent to which the 
design of a firm’s internal scenario captures the specific risks from the firm’s activities, the 
firm’s methods for projecting losses under stress scenarios, and how the firm identifies 
appropriate capital levels and plans for distributions.” Gov. Daniel K. Tarullo, Stress Testing 
After Five Years (June 25, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
tarullo20140625a.htm#f12 [perma.cc/CN4T-ZS4E]. 
 222. 2015 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 221, at 8. 
 223. HIRTLE & LENHERT, supra note 165, at 17. 
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likely many different ways that regulators could design such a qualitative 
stress test, as a start, regulators could follow their current methodology for 
conducting quantitative stress tests—scenario or simulation exercises.  
Regulators could, for example, attempt to design a misconduct simulation 
(i.e., a hypothetical scenario) to which banks would have to respond with 
detailed action plans mapping out the policies in place to hold managing 
directors accountable, stymie the unsocial use of banker networks that may 
have contributed to the incident, and address compensation incentives that 
may have played a role. 
Relatedly, as part of a misconduct simulation, regulators could require 
bank managers to conduct a misconduct premortem.224  Such an exercise 
would be the “hypothetical opposite of a postmortem.”225  Together with 
compliance, bank management would “brainstorm” every conceivable area 
in which the institution is vulnerable to misconduct—thinking about the 
possibility of misconduct in, for example, high profit-generating groups, 
teams with highly concentrated or individual discretion, and groups that 
structure or trade bespoke and especially niche or complex products.  
Lastly, to supplement the information gathered from the scenario-based 
exercise, banks should also provide regulators with a general “compliance 
plan” in conjunction with their capital plans.226 
Compliance stress testing would be an experimental regime.  It allows 
banks to take the lead in designing internal compliance policies and 
procedures to meet general regulatory objectives that are aimed at the 
drivers of misconduct risk.  It thus gives institutional stakeholders the 
opportunity to advise regulators about what types of compliance systems 
work best—and then to prove their success—before top-down regulation is 
imposed, if at all.227  It thus reflects, at base, a complementarity or 
management-based regulation approach in which regulators deploy their 
relative expertise at goal or agenda setting on an industry-wide basis, and 
the private market deploys its relative advantage in knowing the nuances of 
the industry and intimate understanding of what motivates its employees’ 
behavior and why.  Although regulators should be mindful not to let 
flexible standards become “sticky,” ideally, they should encourage the 
kinds of experiments that address the drivers of misconduct and its 
contagion.228  Below are a few examples of what regulators might look for 
in evaluating a bank’s performance during a compliance stress test. 
 
 224. See Gary Klein, Performing a Project Premortem, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2007, at 
18. 
 225. See id. at 18. 
 226. Admittedly this information may be somewhat redundant with information already 
provided to regulators (local or federal) in conjunction with existing supervisory schemes but 
should nonetheless be incorporated into the Fed’s determination as to whether the bank 
passes the compliance stress test.  Over time, regulatory redundancies or overlap could be 
eliminated. 
 227. See generally Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 169–83 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
 228. See supra Part II. 
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a.  Imputed Responsibility to Managing Directors 
Clarifying the consequences of misconduct at the managing director level 
can help reduce the extent to which complexity is used as an “accountability 
firewall.”229  Specifically, making responsibilities broader and clearer can 
strip away the ability to hide behind complexity.  The United Kingdom 
provides an interesting model.  Regulators there recently designed a “Senior 
Managers and Certification Regime,” in force as of March 7, 2016.230  
Pursuant to this new regime, covered financial firms are required to submit 
to regulators a “Statement of Responsibilities” and a “Management 
Responsibilities Map” setting out the areas in which managers are 
responsible.231  For a time, the U.K. certification regime also included a 
“presumption of responsibility” against which managers would be held for 
any issues of misconduct unless they could show that they took steps to 
prevent it, but recent legislation replaces that reverse burden with a 
statutory duty of responsibility.232  The theory behind the U.K. 
accountability regime seems promising:  by ramping hierarchical 
accountability, managers are better incentivized to understand and closely 
monitor even the most complex transactions.  Following this U.K. 
experiment, supervisors in the United States and elsewhere might use 
compliance stress testing to encourage banks to experiment with a similar 
responsibility regime, which the banks themselves could establish and 
govern internally. 
Regulators might also use compliance stress testing to encourage banks 
to experiment with more creative ways to link professional misconduct to 
bankers’ reputation.  An apocryphal story has it that the CEO of a large 
private investment company once told his employees that if they ever 
engaged in a whiff of misconduct, he would use all of the resources at his 
disposal to ensure that the person never worked in finance again.  The 
lesson to take away from that anecdote is that bank managers could exploit 
the value of their bankers’ and traders’ social capital and treat it like a form 
of reputational compensation paid and earned in a prestige-driven industry.  
 
 229. PARLIAMENTARY COMM’N ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR GOOD:  
REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS (VOLUME I), 2013–
14, HL 27-II, at 16 (UK), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/ 
Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf [perma.cc/DV74-ZJKT]. 
 230. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., CP15/22, STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN BANKING 
5–6 (2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-papers/cp15-22.pdf 
[perma.cc/2EL5-PDNA]; SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES ARISING 
FROM THE REVISED UK SENIOR MANAGER AND CERTIFICATION REGIME 2 (2015), 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2015/11/Implementatio
n-Issues-Arising-from-the-Revised-UK-Senior-Manager-and-Certification-Regime-FIA-
100215.pdf [perma.cc/X5VF-XFU2]. 
 231. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 230, at 112. 
 232. MAYER BROWN LLP, THE UK’S NEW REGULATORY REGIME FOR INDIVIDUALS PART 3:  
THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND FINANCIAL SERVICES BILL 2015, at 1 (2015), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/cc394777-75ce-44db-87de-e2c866716baa/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/99ccc8ff-0b2c-4ad1-b067-ecbddacca029/UK-new-
regulatory-regime-for-individuals-Part-3_oct1615.pdf [perma.cc/CH9V-GLE7]; SHEARMAN 
& STERLING LLP, supra note 230, at 2–3. 
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Stated differently, if bank managers exact a reputational price for 
misconduct, which costs bankers and traders their professional mobility, 
such consequences may not only disincentivize misconduct, but also inhibit 
the spread of unethical norms throughout the industry. 
b.  Per Se Clawbacks 
Much ink has been spilled on the topic of executive compensation and 
how best to structure compensation to avoid serious agency and moral 
hazard problems.233  Financial reform legislation in the United States has 
commonly required that companies instate clawback policies as a way to 
incentivize proper conduct.  However, the most prominent of these 
clawback provisions—found both in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010—have been rather narrow in scope, limited to 
accounting misstatements by senior executives.234  Europe, in contrast, has 
recently expanded its clawback regime to include misconduct more broadly.  
Capital Requirements Directive IV requires banks to make up to 100 
percent of discretionary pay subject to malus or clawbacks “in situations 
where the employee contributed to conduct which resulted in significant 
losses to the institution or failed to meet appropriate fit and proper 
standards.”235  In the United Kingdom, under new rules in effect on January 
1, 2015, all firms regulated by the Prudential Regulatory Authority must 
clawback compensation “in instances of misconduct” for up to seven years 
after the compensation is awarded.236  Following those examples, 
institutionally arranged clawback policies may be another feature that 
regulators could “test” during a compliance stress test.  In particular, 
regulators might view favorably simulation responses that demonstrated 
clear policies for clawing back compensation from both the junior bankers 
directly involved in misconduct as well as from the managing directors 
overseeing the teams. 
Increasing accountability through clawback policies, at the middle 
manager level especially, could be a fruitful experiment in enhancing 
accountability.  Clawing back managing directors’ compensation could 
have a far-reaching incentive effect in a bank.  For managing directors, the 
 
 233. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 33; Roberta Romano & Sanjai Bhagat, 
Reforming Executive Compensation:  Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE 
J. REG. 359 (2009). 
 234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012); Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 
§ 954 (2010); see Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules Requiring Companies to Adopt 
Clawback Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/pressrelease/2015-136.html [perma.cc/CNK8-XTE7]. 
 235. Will Pearce & Michael Sholem, Remuneration in the Financial Services Industry 
2015, HARV. CORP. L. & GOVERNANCE BLOG (Sept. 18, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2015/09/18/remuneration-in-the-financial-services-industry-2015 [perma.cc/XGF7-
692L]; see Directive 2013/36/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 94(n), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 389. 
 236. Pearce & Sholem, supra note 235. 
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prospect of several years of lost compensation would likely motivate—
strongly—these senior bankers to monitor more closely the transactions 
within their zones of responsibility.  The increased oversight could in turn 
change the status quo in which junior bankers have come to expect that 
profits from misconduct can inflate their compensation well before 
misconduct is discovered or linked to that individual’s actions.  
Consequently, if managing directors are more aggressively incentivized to 
oversee their subordinates—and be ethical mentors more broadly—then 
junior bankers’ risk-reward calculus changes significantly, and misconduct 
seems like a much less rational choice.237 
Though less studied, linking compensation to value-based goals may also 
have potential.  This linkage has some precedent outside the financial 
services industry.  Wal-Mart, for example, has used executive compensation 
to further diversity goals.238  In 2004, a class action was filed against Wal-
Mart for discrimination.239  Before the class was certified, Wal-Mart 
announced that, as a compliance initiative, it would tie compensation to 
diversity goals regarding women and other minorities.240  Something 
similar might work in banks, where executive or managerial compensation 
is tied to conduct-related goals.  Measuring improvement would, of course, 
be a real challenge in the short term; but the experiment itself may prompt 
more work to be done on finding good metrics to assess changes in conduct. 
c.  Mapping Networks 
Lastly, because a major pipeline for interbank misconduct is social, it is 
important for the CCO to understand and be able to map the social and 
professional networks of the bank’s employees.  This requires a shift in the 
current hierarchical and inward focus of compliance departments.  
Becoming familiar with bankers’ and traders’ employment and educational 
backgrounds would be a good first start in understanding whom they may 
be speaking to and how they might be influenced. 
C.  International Regulatory Coordination 
As earlier noted, Part III’s principal goal is to urge national bank 
regulators—like central banks—to strengthen Basel III’s existing Pillar 2 in 
order to better address misconduct risk in the global banking sector.  Part III 
also offered one preliminary suggestion for how this might be done through 
qualitative stress testing.  Going forward, the remainder of Part III is largely 
architectural:  it provides a second policy proposal for achieving 
international cooperation around a new Pillar 2 supervisory rule.  To that 
 
 237. See Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 121. 
 238. See Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Plans Changes to Some Labor Practices, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at C2. 
 239. See Steven Greenhouse & Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Sex-Bias Suit Given Class-
Action Status, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A1. 
 240. Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Promises to Do Better, WASH. POST, June 5, 2004, at 
E01. 
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end, Part III.C first presents a proposal for using the Basel regime as a 
vehicle for brokering international regulatory coordination around enhanced 
supervision of misconduct risk.  Part III.C concludes with a suggestion, 
albeit speculative, that the trade-off proposed would enhance stability and 
efficiency in the global banking sector. 
The basic proposal builds on an argument made by Professor Roberta 
Romano for a “diversity mechanism” in Basel:  that Basel requirements 
“operate as ‘off the rack’ defaults” that could be altered in any direction, 
subject to a peer review and ongoing monitoring.241  The proposal here is to 
modify Basel III to give states discretion to depart from the current capital 
regime (say, from the Tier 1 or the buffer requirement) in exchange for 
implementing supervisory exercises that monitor for misconduct risk—such 
as compliance stress testing or another agreed upon supervisory program 
that accomplished the same goals.242  In this way, Pillar 1 would be used to 
set a baseline as it currently does, from which national regulators could 
depart downward by some preapproved amount, upon undertaking 
additional supervision. 
Why would states agree to do this?  For one, as Romano has pointed out, 
national regulators, it appears, want to cooperate with Basel.243  For the 
most part, major financial jurisdictions have not (visibly) cheated with 
respect to the Basel III regime in this post-Crisis order, despite the 
competitive gains that cheating in this system could yield for any one 
country’s national banks.244  Quite likely, regulators perceive Basel as 
necessary to their collective economic stability.  At the same time, states are 
also surely aware of the economic advantages of lower capital ratios for 
their banks.  Taken together, lower capital ratios should be attractive to 
national regulators, but only if such abatement neither sacrifices stability of 
the global economic environment in which their banks do business nor risks 
the ire of their economic partners.  A capital-for-supervision regulatory 
tradeoff could serve those dual objectives. 
Having sketched out the basic idea of a capital-supervision tradeoff, the 
remainder of Part III.C briefly explains why using Pillar 1 to incentivize 
national regulatory action under Pillar 2—i.e., creating a capital-for-
supervision tradeoff—is desirable for stability and efficiency reasons.245 
 
 241. Romano, supra note 15, at 6–7 (urging greater experimentation in the Basel regime, 
whereby states “present [a] contemplated departure” to Basel for the Committee’s approval, 
which, if accepted, would be subject to “ongoing monitoring and periodic reassessment”). 
 242. For an explanation of how Basel arrived at the Basel III capital ratios for Tier 1 
common equity and the buffer, see Beverly Hirtle, How Were the Basel 3 Minimum Capital 
Requirements Calibrated?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/03/calibrating-regulatory-minimum-
capital-requirements.html#.VV_ARU_BzRY [perma.cc/7PQQ-PMVS]. 
 243. Romano, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 244. Cf. Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the 
WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383 (2007) (applying a game theoretic lens to analyze ongoing 
negotiations between the United States and European Union regarding whether the World 
Trade Organization should be expanded to include antitrust issues). 
 245. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that these goals should animate and 
constrain systemic risk regulation). 
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1.  Stability 
There are several reasons why supervising misconduct risk should be an 
internationally coordinated effort.  For one, the institutions that perpetuate 
misconduct risk are global.  While most of these banks have operations in 
the United States, and are thus subject to Fed supervision as “foreign bank 
operations” (FBOs), the FBOs’ primary regulators are of course foreign; the 
mothership operations are outside the Fed’s supervisory purview.  
Coordination between host and home regulators is therefore of practical 
necessity to ensure that any one global bank is, as a whole, resilient against 
misconduct risk.  Related is the problem of regulatory arbitrage, whereby, 
in the absence of international coordination, a global bank can evade new 
supervisory standards for conduct simply by shifting its activities to an un- 
(or less-) regulated jurisdiction.246 
Yet absent compelling incentives, international coordination around 
enhanced supervisory standards may be difficult to negotiate.  From the 
perspective of European regulators and their legislatures, at least, creating 
more regulation in the current political environment may be too 
unpalatable.247  Public authorities may fear that more regulation, now, will 
weaken the competitiveness of the national financial industry or that 
reluctant states will defect and refuse to go along when push comes to 
shove.248  Moreover, one might expect the financial industry itself to lobby 
against added measures out of concern for growing compliance costs and 
the perceived inefficiencies of additional government involvement.  Such 
private sector resistance would further impede regulators’ (or politicians’) 
willpower to implement additional misconduct-related measures. 
With respect to qualitative stress testing specifically, consider the 
difference in stress testing that already exists between the United States and 
Europe—two of the most significant financial services jurisdictions.  The 
 
 246. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of Fate:  Toward Financial 
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 416 (2011) (referring to regulatory 
arbitrage as the phenomenon “whereby financial institutions find new ways to get around 
government rules, thus creating a never-ending spiral of rulemaking and rule evading”). 
 247. Both France and Germany appear to have resisted increased capital requirements in 
the Basel III accord. See Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, EU Ministers Set for Clash Over 
Banking Rules, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2012, at 2; Donna Borak, Bair Details Inside Story of 
Regulatory Clash Over Basel III, AM. BANKER (Sept. 25, 2012), http:// 
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over-basel-1053019-1.html [perma.cc/9C2R-KLJG]. 
 248. As the Deutsche Bundesbank has said, 
The supervisory review process represents a great challenge for banking 
supervisors in Germany.  In the international context it is crucial to achieve greater 
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different countries. 
Pillar 2:  The Supervisory Review Process (SRP), DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, http://www. 
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see Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L 
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EBA has not yet adopted a qualitative component of stress testing.249  And, 
regardless, its standards in general have seemed lax since stress testing 
began in Europe in 2010.  European officials admitted that the 2014 
exercise was too soft, as was made all too clear after Ireland’s two largest 
banks were bailed out by the government only two weeks after passing the 
test.250  (Other banks have also failed after passing the EBA’s test.251)  But 
Europe may nonetheless resist an expansion of its stress testing regime.  
European officials have registered their disagreement with the way in which 
the Fed stress tests European FBOs and criticized the qualitative component 
of CCAR as subjective.252  This suggests that using capital ratios as carrots 
may be the most effective way to motivate nations to agree to collectively 
undertake a supervisory exercise like compliance stress testing. 
2.  Efficiency 
Efficiency provides a second reason for offering Pillar 1 capital 
reductions where a new Pillar 2 supervisory rule is adopted.  To begin, a 
capital-for-supervision tradeoff makes intuitive economic sense.  Removing 
risk from the system by reducing misconduct should enable a reduction in 
firms’ capital requirements—which are, after all, designed to protect banks 
from hypothetical stress, including that which might be caused by 
systemically significant misconduct.  Therefore, if a jurisdiction reduces 
misconduct risk from its financial environment, its national banks will on 
average withstand less stress and should, therefore, require a lower capital 
reserve as a buffer.253 
Moreover, regulators may soon be looking for safe ways to lower Pillar 
1’s capital requirements in the coming years.  The Basel regime (along with 
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the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States) appears to have had some 
unintended consequences.254  A recent report by the Office of Financial 
Research, an independent arm of the Treasury, indicated that inventories of 
fixed-income assets are down in the broker-dealers.255  Shrinking 
inventories implies that financial institutions will be less able to keep 
liquidity flowing in the event of a stressful shock.256 
There is also some reason to think that the costs of complying with the 
Basel regime may be weakening banks’ defenses against other threats to 
their stability.  A study conducted by the market research group Federal 
Financial Analytics found that U.S. banks alone absorb $70.2 billion a year 
in post-Crisis regulatory costs.257  These costs detract from the resources 
that banks have to deal with other operational risks, like cyber-attacks and 
information failure.258  In fact, regulators now fear that “banks simply lack 
the resources with which to meet new rules, support credit demand, and 
simultaneously increase their resilience to cyber-attack and undertake other 
costly information-technology improvements.”259  And this strain on the 
global banking sector has implications for financial stability more broadly:  
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government officials, who have grown increasingly concerned that liquidity in the fixed-
income markets is drying up and that the Dodd-Frank regulatory apparatus is largely to 
blame.” Id. But see John Heltman, Is Regulation the Reason Liquidity Is So Unstable?, AM. 
BANKER (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/is-
regulation-the-reason-liquidity-is-so-unstable-1076270-1.html (noting that whether recent 
regulation is causing the lack of liquidity in bond markets is a contested matter) 
[perma.cc/3X5L-DXK8]. 
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“To the extent operational resilience is weakened at banking organizations, 
financial-market operational resilience will be similarly strained, especially 
in complex, cross-border, and/or capital markets operations.”260 
Lastly, the growth of the “shadow banking” sector may be another side 
effect of heightened capital requirements.  The shadow banking system 
consists of an unregulated (or laxly regulated) system of financial 
intermediation, much of which involves securitization and wholesale 
funding.261  Some have argued that financial activity is migrating to the 
shadow banking sector in response to (i.e., to avoid) the cost of new 
regulation imposed on traditional banks.262  The expanse of shadow 
banking has regulators worried—and possibly, with good reason.  It makes 
the economy vulnerable to destabilizing events like asset bubbles; shadow 
banking also increases “liquidity discontinuity” (because it, like the 
traditional banking sector, “provides short-term funding for long-term 
capital needs”), which can lead to events that mimic a classic bank run.263  
And the growth of this system may also increase misconduct risk insofar as 
these institutions’ opacity (and diffusion) make monitoring for misconduct 
difficult.264  For all of these reasons and others, Mark Carney named 
shadow banking as “the greatest danger to the world economy,” and the 
Economist described it as a “huge, fast-growing,” “little understood,” and 
“potentially explosive” area.265 
Ultimately, it is somewhat speculative to say that reducing capital ratios 
will reduce or slow the growth of the shadow banking system or will restore 
liquidity.  But the proposal for a capital-for-supervision trade-off should, at 
a minimum, prompt regulatory thought about the optimal balance between 
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capital and supervision—and challenge the assumption that Basel II has 
struck it. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a framework for understanding misconduct as a 
distinct category of risk to the global markets—misconduct risk.  It has 
argued that misconduct risk is underaddressed in the current architecture of 
global banking regulation, embodied in the Basel regime.  In particular, this 
Article critiqued the imbalance in this international framework:  that it 
focuses on the quantitative sources of risk in banks but neglects the 
systemic significance of misconduct risk.  Given the costs that misconduct 
risk imposes, striking a better balance should be a high priority for banking 
regulation today. 
Yet in order for regulators to most effectively deploy their finite 
resources to reduce misconduct risk, they must first understand the drivers 
of that risk.  This Article explored three structural features of the banking 
sector that, together, give rise to misconduct risk in the global banking 
sector.  It then offered a policy proposal to address it:  to modify Pillar 2 of 
the Basel III regime to include standards for “compliance stress testing,” 
which would leverage the private sector’s efforts to reduce misconduct risk 
by inhibiting its industry-wide growth and transmission.  Ultimately, it 
suggested how that revision might be coordinated among Basel’s members. 
